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ABSTRACT: 
 
Most scholars agree that both control and trust are important for IJV success. This study 
examines the impact of control and trust on IJV performance by using multiple case 
studies. 
 
In the theoretical part of the study, firstly the concept of control is studied by underlying 
the importance of control in IJV and identifying three dimensions of control in IJV.  
Secondly, the concept of trust has been discussed by analyzing the three important 
dimensions of trust. Thirdly, IJV performance concept and its measurements have been 
discussed. Fourth, the relationship between control and performance, and the link 
between trust and performance were analyzed.  
 
For the empirical study, both objective and subjective measurements were used, and all 
parent companies’ perspective was gathered through semi-structured telephone interview. 
The main conclusions are the following: First, both Chinese and British parent 
companies agree that control mechanisms, control focus and control extent has positive 
relation with IJV financial output, overall satisfaction and goal achievement. 
Furthermore, both Chinese and British parent companies agree that trust has positive 
relation with IJV performance. In addition, Chinese parent companies believe that there 
is positive relation between control and trust in IJV. Finally, findings reveal that control 
has direct effect on IJV performance and trust has indirect effect on IJV performance.  
 
 
KEYWORDS: International joint venture, control, trust, performance.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This first chapter aims to present the general picture of this study. First, the background 
of the study draws the research gap in previous literature and the need for the present 
study. Second, the research questions generate from the extant studies. Third, it 
comprises brief discussion of previous studies and the potential contribution of this study 
for both academic and practitioners. In the end, the structure of the study is presented. 
 
1.1. Background of the study     
 
During the last couple of decades, international business has changed its nature as more 
global, creating new opportunities as well as making the success and even survival of a 
firm more difficult. In order to achieve competitive advantage and survival in this global 
market, strategic alliances have become a highly used mode to cope with rapid changes 
in the global market environment. International joint venture as a type of strategic 
alliances has become one of the popular modes which firm use to entry in foreign 
markets. A joint venture (JV) is formed when two or more than two partner firms agree 
to form a new separate entity (Glaister & Buckley 1998). JV can be identified as 
domestic and international. Domestic joint venture is formed when two partner firms are 
from same country, and in international joint venture (IJV), at least one of the parent 
firms is from another country (Geringer & Herbert 1989). This study will focus on IJVs, 
where one of the partner firms is from a foreign county. 
 
There are many motivations for the formation of IJVs. Ekanayke (2008) argues that IJVs 
are formed to reduce the transaction costs by sharing the cost, control, risk, and revenues. 
In the same vein, Nippa et al. (2007) assert that IJVs allow parent firms to access to 
complementary resources, improve knowledge flow and achieve coordination cost 
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advantages. Fryxell et al. (2002) also state that IJVs aim to gain competitive advantage, 
diversify risk, and gain access to new market and technologies.  
 
Although literature identified many benefits of IJVs, however, IJVs are not without 
problems (Glaister & Buckley 1998). Previous researches in IJVs report their high failure 
rate from 30% to 70% of total (Geringer & Hebert 1991; Ekanayke 2008; Nguyen & 
Larimo 2009). Literature on IJVs has put forward various reasons behind the high failure 
rate of IJVs. Groot and Merchant (2000) have pointed out that control problems are one 
of the major reason causing the failure of IJVs. Robson et al. (2006) suggested that lack 
of trust is another main reason contributes to the IJV failure. Das and Teng (2010) argue 
trust and control are two separate routes to risk reduction, it is important to study them 
jointly in terms of IJV performance. 
 
Previous studies present diverse measurement of IJV performance. Some use objective 
measures and some use subjective measurement (Nielsen 2007). Glaister and Buckley 
(1998) suggest that partner may have different objectives in their IJV. Only relying on 
subjective measures of IJV performance is incomplete. Therefore, they suggest the need 
to use both objective and subjective measures for measuring IJV performance. Since 
every partner has own objectives to form IJV, therefore their expectations regarding the 
IJV performance might be very different. It is incomplete to only take one partners’ 
perspective to measure IJV performance. Therefore, there is a need to take both parent 
firms’ perspective rather than relying on one parent firm’s perspective.  
 
Further, extant research on IJV performance have been mainly focused in the context of 
the U.S, Japan, Korea, and Europe (Glaister & Buckley 1998; Yan & Gray 2001; Fryxell 
et al. 2002; Luo 2002; Kauser & Shaw 2004; Brouther & Bamossy 2006; Ng et al. 2007; 
Kwon 2008; Klijin et al. 2010). There is relatively little research focusing on British and 
Chinese IJV performance. China is one of the biggest emerging markets, bringing great 
opportunities for the foreign firms. But, available limited research on British-Chinese 
IJVs depict that foreign IJVs in China have received unsatisfactory IJV performance 
(Child &Yan 1999). Therefore, it is important to learn more about management strategies 
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of British IJVs in China, which can help British managers to improve the performance of 
their IJVs.   
 
1.2. Objectives and limitations of the study  
 
Objectives of the study 
 
The main purpose of this study is to analyze the importance of control and trust and their 
effect on IJV performance in Sino-British IJVs. The main research question is addressed 
as: 
What is the relation between control, trust and performance in International Joint 
Ventures in China? 
To answer this main research question, five specific research objectives for this study are 
addresses as: 
1. To increase the understanding about the nature of control in IJVs. 
2. To analyse the key concept “trust”.  
3. To conceptualize the key concept of “performance”. 
4. To theoretically analyse the link between “control” and “performance”, and the link 
between “trust” and “performance” in IJVs.  
5. To empirically analyse the relation between “control” and “performance”, and the 
relation between “trust” and “performance” in Sino-British IJVs. 
 
The first sub-research objective is to increase the understanding about the nature of 
control in IJVs. The aim is to provide better understanding of IJVs control by elaborating 
its three dimensions: control mechanism, control focus and control extent. The resource 
dependence theory and transaction cost theory with the relation to IJV control are 
explained. 
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The second sub-research objective is to analyse the key concept “trust”. The aim is to 
give a broad view of IJVs trust through the deeper discussion of trust definitions and 
dimensions. The resource dependence theory and transaction cost theory with the relation 
to IJV trust are explained. 
 
The third sub-research objective is to conceptualize the key concept of “performance”. It 
aims to present its complex definition and dimensions giving more comprehensive view 
of IJV performance measurements. 
 
The fourth sub-research objective is to theoretically analyse the link between “control” 
and “performance”, “trust” and “performance” in IJV, and the relation between “control” 
and “trust” in IJV. 
 
The fifth sub-research objective is to empirically analyse the link between “control” and 
“performance”, and “trust” and “performance” in Sino-British IJV. In particular, the 
present empirically findings will be answering the question: what impact does control 
have on IJV performance and what impact does trust have on IJV performance in China. 
 
Limitation of the study 
 
The scope of this study is the Sino-British joint ventures formed in China. The focus of 
this study is manufacturing industry. The examination of the relation between control, 
trust and performance in IJV is limited to both parents firm’s perspective.  
 
Empirically, the study is based on 8 case studies. The 8 case studies cannot be the 
representative of all types of manufacturing joint ventures.  
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1.3. Previous studies and contribution of the present study 
 
Previous studies 
The previous studies used in this study were selected by searching from different 
electronic databases including Business Source Premier (EBSCO), ABI inform Global 
(ProQuest Central: Business & Economics), and Emerald Journals. These databases 
provide rich articles in the popular journals of international business, international 
management, international marketing, business research etc. The terms “international 
joint venture (IJV)”, “control”, “trust”, “IJV performance”, and “Chinese IJV” were used 
separately and jointly to collect related studies. Base on the result of searching, the most 
popular and fundamental studies have chosen for this study. Table 1 lists the previous 
studies. 
 
Ren, Gray and Kim (2009) conducted a literature review on IJVs and found that 
researchers are shifting their attention from formation stage to post formation stage in 
order to understand the IJV operations. They mention that since 1999, main focus of IJV 
research has shifted towards conceptualization of IJV performance and its determinants. 
The authors found that researchers did not totally agree on what drives IJV performance 
and how to measure IJV performance. In their study, the literature on international joint 
venture performance drivers from 1999-2009, and the authors have come up with 
different factors that drive IJVs. They derive the list of IJV performance antecedents, 
comprising commitment, bargaining power, control, trust, justice, conflict, conflict 
resolution, cooperation, culture distance and goal congruity.( Glaister & Buckley 1998; 
Yan & Gray 2001; Boateng & Glaister 2002; Fryxell et al. 2002; Luo 2002; Tsang 2002; 
Child & Yan 2003; Luo & Park 2004; Mohr 2004; Brouthers & Bamossy 2006; Choi and 
Chen 2007; Lu 2007; Makino et al. 2007; Ng et al. 2007; Nielsen 2007; Nippa, Beechler 
& Klossek 2007; Selekler-goksen & Uysal-tezolmez 2007; Ren et al. 2009).  
 
Previous studies are not only diverse on what derives IJV performance, but also are 
diverse on the impact of single antecedent of IJV. For example, the previous studies 
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regarding the impact of control on IJVs performance show different results. For instance, 
Killing (1983) found that dominate partner IJVs are more likely successful than shared 
management venture. But, Steensma and Lyles (2000) hold that shared control result 
better performance in an IJV operation. Contrary to Killing (1983) and Steensma and 
Lyles (2000), Choi and Beamish (2004) found that there is no performance difference 
between shared and dominant controlled IJVs. These findings also contrast to Zhang and 
Li (2001) study, where they found that shared management IJVs tend to have worse 
performance than dominant parent IJVs. Although, many authors found that control is 
positively related to IJVs performance (Yan & Gray 2001; Fryxell et al. 2002; Nippa et 
al. 2007; Ekanayke 2008), where Mohr (2004) holds that control is negatively related to 
IJVs performance.  
 
Regarding the relation between trust and IJV performance, the previous studies show that 
trust is positively related to IJV performance. Brouther and Bamossy (2006) assert that 
the greater inter-firm trust will lead to higher IJV performance perceptions. Ng et al. 
(2007) hold that trust has a significant effect on the achievement of IJV goals from both 
partner’s perspective. Fryxell et al. (2002) also found that affect-based trust has positive 
effect on IJV performance. In the same vein, Mohr (2004) found that trust has a positive 
influence on performance. Ekanayke’s (2008) literature review concludes that goodwill 
trust is positively related to IJV performance. 
 
Table 1 Selected previous studies. 
Studies Title/Study focus Methodology 
Sample location 
[Home country 
(HMC), Host 
country (HSC)] 
Number 
of 
IJVs/ISAs 
Geringer and 
Herbert  (1989) 
Control and performance of 
international joint venture 
Theoretical - - 
Glaister  and 
Buckley(1998) 
Management-performance 
relationship in UK joint ventures 
Survey 
HMC: US, Japan, 
Western Europe            
HSC: UK 
94 IJVs 
Inkpen and 
Currall(1998) 
The nature, antecedents and 
consequences of joint venture 
trust 
Theoretical - - 
Child and Yan 
(1999) 
Investment and control in IJV: 
The case of China 
Survey 
HMC: US, Japan, 
Western Europe      
HSC: China 
67 IJVs 
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Das and Teng 
(2001) 
Trust, control and risk in strategic 
alliances: an integrated 
framework 
Theoretical - - 
Yan and Gray 
(2001) 
Antecedent and effect of parent 
control in IJV 
Survey 
HMC: US    
HSC: China 
90 IJVs 
Zhang and Li 
(2001) 
The control design and 
performance in IJV: a dynamic 
evolution perspective 
Multiple case study 
HMC: Japan   HSC: 
China 
8 IJVS 
Fryxell et al. 
(2002) 
After the ink dries: the interaction 
of trust and control in US-based 
IJV 
Survey 
HMC: Japan, 
Canada, Germany, 
UK, French          
HSC:US 
129 IJVs 
Boersma et al. 
(2003) 
Trust in international joint venture 
relationship 
Multiple case study - 4 cases 
Mohr (2004) 
Trust, control, interaction and  
performance in IJVS-A taxonomy 
of German-Chinese JVS 
Interview + Survey 
HMC: Germany          
HSC: China 
27 
interview, 
110 
surveys 
Brouther and 
Bamossy (2006) 
Post-formation processes in 
Eastern and Western European JV 
Multiple case study 
HMC: Western firms      
HSC: Eastern firms  
8 cases 
Robson et al. 
(2006) 
Behavioral attributes and 
performance in ISA: review and 
future directions. 
Theoretical - - 
Nippa, Beechler 
and Klossek 
(2007) 
Success factors for managing 
international joint venture: A 
review and an integrative 
framework 
Theoretical - - 
Selekler-goksen 
& uysal-tezolmez 
(2007) 
Control and performance in IJV in 
turkey 
Survey 
HMC: Foreign 
partner               
HSC: Turkey 
45 IJVs 
Ng et al. (2007) 
The effect of trust on international 
joint venture performance in 
China 
Survey 
HMC:US, Japan, 
Taiwan    
HSC: China 
298 IJVs 
Ekanayke (2008) 
The role of trust in joint venture 
control: a theoretical framework 
Theoretical - - 
kwon (2008) 
Antecedent and consequences of 
IJV partnership: A social 
exchange perspective 
Survey 
HMC: US, Europe, 
Japan,          
HSC: Korea 
94 IJVs 
Nguyen and 
Larimo (2009) 
Foreign parent strategies, control 
and international joint venture 
performance 
Survey 
HMC: Foreign 
partner          
HSC: Finland 
49 IJVs 
Ren et al. (2009) 
Performance of international joint 
ventures: what factors really make 
a difference and how 
Theoretical - - 
Jagd (2010) 
Balancing trust and control in 
organizations: toward a process 
perspective 
Theoretical - - 
Klijin et al. 
(2010) 
Combinations of partners' joint 
venture formation motives 
Survey 
HMC:EEIGs  
HSC: EEIGs 
47IJVs 
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Contribution of the present study 
 
Previous research on IJVs has either focused on control-IJV performance link or trust-
performance link. By studying both links in the present study is an important 
contribution to existing knowledge on IJV performance antecedents. This can also help 
managers to understand the importance of control and trust for IJV performance 
simultaneously, rather than focusing only on one antecedent. As Das and Teng (2001) 
suggested, trust and control are two separate routes to risk reduction, and firms need to 
combine and balance them in specific ways to achieve best risk management and 
performance improvement. An integrated framework presents more comprehensive 
pictures of the relation between control, trust and performance. 
 
Further, previous research has merely focused on one partner’s point of view of IJV 
performance. However, this research is biased as IJV success should be assesses from 
both parties  ´ perspective. Glaister and Buckley (1998) also suggest that taking one 
partner’s perspective on IJV performance is incomplete. By measuring performance from 
both parents of IJV will add to the existing research on IJV performance measurement. 
Further, another contribution of present study will be to use both objective and subjective 
measures for IJV performance.  
 
Finally, a deeper understanding of control and trust issues and their relation to 
performance will help the IJV managers of both British and Chinese firms to understand 
how to utilise control and trust to achieve success in their IJVs operating in China. The 
following Figure 1 depicts the contribution of the present study. 
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1.4.  Structure of the study 
 
The study has been structured as follows: 
  
In Chapter 1, the background and the aims of the study along with research problem of 
the study are presented. Previous studies are shortly viewed and potential contribution 
and structure of the study is presented. 
 
Chapter 2: This chapter describes the concept of control in IJVs. This chapter unfolds 
with the conceptualization of control dimensions, following with the foundation theories 
of IJV control.  At the end, the summary of chapter is presented. 
 
Chapter 3: This chapter opens up with the discussion of complexity of the concept of 
Focus areas in previous studies 
Focus areas in present study 
Trust 
Objective or Subjective Performance 
From one partner’s perspective 
 
 
 
Objective or Subjective Performance 
From one partner’s perspective 
 
Control  
Trust 
Objective and Subjective Performance 
From both partners’ perspective 
Control 
Figure 1 Contribution of present study. 
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trust in IJVs. Further, different dimensions of trust are discussed from previous literature. 
Then, the discussion on foundation theories of IJV trust is presented.  At the end, 
summary of this chapter is presented. 
 
Chapter 4: This chapter first describes the dimensions of performance and performance 
measurements in IJVs. Then, discusses on the impact of control and trust on IJV 
performance has been separately presented. At the end, the summary of this chapter is 
presented. 
 
Chapter 5: This chapter explains the methodology used in present study. It opens up 
with the discussion of research method, case study research and, criticism and benefits of 
case study research. Furthermore, case study design for the present study is explained, 
and at the end of this chapter, the validity and reliability of the study is discussed. 
 
Chapter 6: This chapter introduces the case company and then describes the empirical 
results of the study.  . 
 
Chapter 7: In this chapter, the summary and conclusions are drawn on the basis of 
framework and empirical findings. At the end of chapter, managerial implications and 
implications for theory and future research are presented. 
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2. CONCEPT OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES 
 
This chapter aims to present the concept of control in IJVs. First, the definitions of IJV 
control and its dimensions are discussed. Second, the foundation theories are discussed, 
explaining the reasons of IJV formation and the importance of IJV control. In the end, 
the summary of this chapter is presented. 
 
2.1. Conceptualization of IJV control   
 
International expansion often entails formation of international joint ventures. However, 
scholars have found that most of the IJVs are not successful (Geringer & Hebert 1991; 
Glaister & Buckley 1998; Child &Yan 1999; Boersma et al. 2003; Brouthers & Bamossy 
2006; Nguyen & Larimo 2009).  In this perspective, the importance of control in IJVs 
success gathers great attention from scholars. Brouthers and Bamossy (2006) assert that 
those firms that fail to establish control process, quite often find that their IJV does not 
survive. Furthermore, Ng et al. (2007) claim that maintaining an effective and efficient 
control over IJV operations is one of the important keys for the success of IJVs. 
Similarly, Nguyen and Larimo (2009) study holds that control plays an important role in 
IJV success. In the same vein, Das and Teng (2001) identified that two kind of risk in 
strategic alliance (i.e., relational risk and performance risk) are handled effectively with 
control in IJVs. 
 
Due to the importance of control in IJVs, previous researches have focused on control in 
IJVs. In the organizational literature, control refers to the process that regulates behaviors 
of organizational members in favor of the achievement of organizational goals (Glaister 
& Buckley 1998; Das & Teng 2001; Jagd 2010). The notion of control in IJVs is much 
more complex and multifaceted concept, since two or more parties join in the 
management control of IJVs.  
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In 1983, Killing elaborated the structural perspective of IJV control and defined control 
as “the amount of power each parent exercises in influencing the IJV to achieve its 
objectives”. Later on, many researchers took this notion of control to conduct their 
studies on control and IJV performance relationship. But results of these studies are 
diversified. For example, Steensma and Lyles (2000) hold that shared control result 
better performance in IJVs. Whereas, Choi and Beamish (2004) found that there is no 
performance difference between shared and dominant control in IJV operation. These 
findings contrast to research by Zhang and Li (2001) study findings, who found that 
shared management IJVs tend to have worse performance than dominant parent IJVs. 
Therefore, the importance of IJV control varies, especially in the relation to IJV 
performance.  
 
Child et al. (2005:15) hold that control is a central aspect of IJV management, and 
essential element in any system that holds managers accountable for their actions and 
decisions. Das and Teng (2001: 258) defined control as “a regulatory process by which 
the elements of a system are made more predicate through the establishment of standards 
in the pursuit of some desired objective or state.” The aim of control in IJVs is to get 
predictability through regulatory mean. This predictability creates confidence that other 
partners will not behave opportunism. If all the partners possess such confidence, they 
are more likely to collaborate in governing their joint creation that will improve the IJVs 
performance (Fryxell et al. 2002; Nguyen& Larimo 2009). 
 
The present study adopts the notion of control defined by Geringer and Hebert (1989: 
236-237), which is defined as:  
 “the process by which one partner influences, to varying degrees, the behaviour and 
output of the other partner, through the use of power, authority and a wide range of 
bureaucratic, cultural and informal mechanisms.”  
Geringer and Hebert (1989) define three dimensions of control in IJVs: mechanisms, 
focus, and extent. The control mechanism refers to the means by which control is 
exercised. The control focus refers to the scope of activities which a parent seeks to 
exercise or not exercise in IJV. The control extent refers to the degree to which the 
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parents exercise control over IJV. According to Geringer and Hebert (1989), these three 
dimensions of control need to be jointly examined in order to get better understanding of 
how control affects the performance of IJVs. 
 
2.1.1 Control mechanisms 
 
Fryxell et al. (2002: 868) defined control mechanisms as “structural arrangements 
deployed to determine and influence what members of an organization do”.  The 
previous literatures suggest that there are two types of control mechanisms: external 
measure-based control and internal value-based control (Das & Teng 2001; Jagd 2010).  
External measured-based control refers to establish and utilize formal rules, procedures 
and policies to monitor and reward desirable goals. It is also called formal control and 
objective control (Das & Teng 2001; Fryxell 2002; Jagd 2010). In this study, we adopt 
the name of “formal control” since it is the most used name in previous studies. Internal 
value-based control relies on establishing the organizational norms, values, culture to 
encourage desirable behaviour and outcome. In this manner, control is intended to reduce 
goal incongruence and preference divergence among organizational members. It has also 
been called clan control, informal control, and normative control (Das & Teng 2001; 
Fryxell 2002; Jagd 2010). The term “social control” has been used interchangeably with 
“informal control” (Leifer & Mills 1996). In this study I adopt the name of “informal 
control” since it is the most used name in previous studies. According to Fryxell (2002), 
both formal and informal control mechanisms are needed in IJVs since they have 
different influences on organizational behaviours.  
 
Formal control is aimed to protect the assets of the partner firms by standards, rules and 
procedures (Fryxell et al. 2002). Fryxell et al. (2002) argue that, through rules and 
regulations, opportunism will be easily identified and dealt with in a timely manner. 
Therefore formal control is good a mechanism to decrease the potential for opportunism. 
Moreover, they also hold that it is critical to adopt formal control in the early stage of 
IJV, since formal rules and procedures introduces a mutually agreed upon basis for 
monitoring behaviour and performance that provide the necessary stability and efficiency 
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to IJV. Finally, they claim that control mechanisms are mutually agreed upon and 
imposed by agreement between partners.  
 
In terms of formal control, previous research shows that a foreign parent firm often 
favours ownership equity as the main control mechanisms in IJV (Glaister & Buckley 
1998; Child & Yan 1999; Fryxell et al. 2002; Kauser & Shaw 2004; Selekler-goksen & 
Uysal-tezolmez 2007). In addition to majority equity shareholdings, parent firms use 
different formal control mechanism to control over IJV, such as board representation, 
appointment of key personnel by the foreign parent, and provisions for voting right 
(Fryxell et al. 2002; Selekler-goksen & Uysal-tezolmez 2007 ) .  
 
Informal control is designed to permit the evolution and inculcation of norms and 
values through structural personal interaction and training (Fryxell et al. 2002). Informal 
control refers to mechanisms such as socialization, interaction, and training. The aim of 
these informal control mechanisms is to create cultural ties between the partners through 
the training and socialization of IJV managers, thus increase the confidence of parent 
firms in IJVs (Child et al. 2005). Moreover, Das and Teng (2001) suggest that informal 
control may reduce relational risk through establishment of shared values, thus deter 
partner firms from acting opportunistically. They mention that informal control can 
reduce performance risk as well, since it encourages the partners firms to lay out 
reasonable and achievable goals. To establish appropriate goals is critical for satisfactory 
performance.  
 
In addition, informal control has the potential to reduce monitoring and contraction costs 
and permit the flexibility and adaptability that are critical to long-term performance in 
IJV. However, informal control mechanisms by themselves are not sufficient to ensure 
the attainment of partner control, and informal control mechanisms do not necessarily 
lead to informal control. (Fryxell et al. 2002)     
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 2.1.2 Control focus 
 
Control focus refers to the areas of the IJV’s operation in which control is exercised. 
According to Geringer and Hebert (1989), parents can choose to have broad control 
focus or narrow control focus over IJV. Broad control focus in IJV means attempt to 
exercise control over the entire range of the IJV’s activities, and narrow control focus 
means only focus on one or two areas in IJV, which are considerably important for the 
parent firms.  
 
Child and Yan (1999) hold that the foreign parent firms often focus more on the 
importance of financial and accounting area, and they place their own financial managers 
in IJVs in order to have accurate reporting. Kauser and Shaw (2004) claim that majority 
of IJVs see control over specific “strategically important activities” rather than control 
over the whole IJV. Child et al. (2005) assert that parent firms focus their control on 
activities related to technology and market. Later on Nguyen and Larimo (2009) suggest 
the most critical areas, which parent firm’s focus for control in IJVs include: 1) 
marketing, sales, distribution, 2) procurement, 3) general management and operation, 4) 
finance and accounting, 5) research and development 6) production and quality, and 7) 
human resources.   
 
 2.1.3 Control extent 
 
According to Geringer and Hebert (1989), control extent refers to the tightness of control 
which is exercised. Control extent consists of tight control and loose control.  
 
Tight control tends to be strict with respect to the employee’s dress code, punctuality, 
cost-consciousness, detail oriented, and precise in operation. Tight control gives the 
partner the high degree of certainty that personnel in the IJV will act as the given 
partner’s wish. Further, tightness of control can be affected by control mechanisms. For 
example, frequent and precise reporting reflects the degree of tightness of control (Child 
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et al. 2005). Nguyen and Larimo (2009) hold that control can be tightened by more 
intensive training of IJV employees in production and management techniques.  
 
Parent firm conduct loose control tent to sue only one or two control mechanisms and 
focus their control on only one or two control areas. Furthermore, the parents firms are 
more flexible in their evaluation of employees’ behaviour and their performance. In 
addition, the frequencies of reports from IJV and the meetings between parent company 
and IJV are very few. 
 
2.2. Foundation theories of IJV control  
 
Resource dependence theory and transaction cost economics have become the most 
frequently used theories to explain the IJV control (Child & Yan 1999; Yan & Gray 2001; 
Zhang & Li 2001). In this section, resource dependence theory is discussed, followed by 
the transaction cost theory. After that, they are integrated and justified for using as 
foundation theories in the present study. 
 
 2.2.1 Resource dependence theory 
 
The resource dependence theory was developed by Pfeffer and Salancik in 1978. The 
theory discovered how the behaviour of the organization is affected by the external 
resources of organization. The resource dependence theory assumes that every firm is 
dependent on resources, and firms normally do not have all the resources they need. To 
obtain resources from other firms, firms become dependent on other firms in the 
environment (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). Therefore a firm holding critical resources can 
make the other firms dependent on it, which means that a firm holding critical resources 
can exercise control over other firms (Hillman, Withers & Collins 2009). By controlling 
resources, a firm can reduce its own dependence on other firms and increase the 
dependence of other firms on it (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). 
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Resource dependence theory explains one of most important reason of formation IJV. 
Each party is able to access to complementary resources (Larimo 2002; Nippa, Beechler 
& Klossek 2007; Hillman, Withers & Collins 2009; Klijn et al. 2009). The resources may 
include capital, technology, management know how, global service support, local 
knowledge, production distribution, low cost sourcing and marketing channels (Yan & 
Gray 1999). For instance, the aim of most of foreign firms form IJV with Chinese firm is 
to utilise Chinese firm’s marketing channel, local knowledge, production, and 
distribution to achieve their market share in China. Chinese firms intend to learn new 
technology from the foreign firms (Ren, Gray & Kim 2011).   
 
Resource dependence theory also gives answer to why control is needed in IJVs. 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), the ability of an owner to exercise control 
depends on its own ability to deliver resources in IJV. Contrarily, if party do not control 
the critical resource it provides in the IJVs, it will lose its control position through time. 
For instance, company A provides critical technology in IJV without control over it, 
company B may easily learn it and start own business without cooperation with company 
A after some years. Company A will lose its control position in the end.  Similarly, 
Hillman et al. (2009) hold one partner accumulates key resources from the other, the 
venture become less stable. Furthermore, Child et al. (2005) argue that parent firms stress 
on to protect the integrity and the use of the resource they supply. Therefore, they all 
want to exercise control in certain level over IJVs. Moreover, Choi (2001) asserts that 
according to resource dependence theory, the choice of activities of control is important 
to IJV performance. It also suggests that IJV control structure may change due to the 
change in parent resources over time (Zhang & Li 2001). 
 
 2.2.2 Transaction cost theory 
 
Transaction cost theory was developed by Williamson (1975, 1985, 1991). It argues that 
the relative choice of governance structure (i.e., markets, hybrids, and hierarchies) base 
on two key behavioral assumptions, i.e., bounded rationality and threat of opportunism, 
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and three characteristics of economic transactions, i.e., uncertainty, assets specificity and 
transaction frequency. 
 
 A transaction refers to an exchange of property rights in assets, where the property rights 
give the owner the right to exclude others from using, renting and selling the asset. 
Transaction cost defined as the costs related to operate the market system which includes 
costs related to searching for a party with whom to transact, negotiating the term of 
transaction, monitoring the party fulfilling the exchange obligations (Coase 1937). 
According to transaction cost theory (Williamson 1991), there are 3 types of governance 
structures: market, hybrid and hierarchy (see figure 3).  
 
The theoretical basis of transaction cost theory lies in the work by Coase (1937,1960) 
and the economic literature on externalities, which explains how to choice the 
governance structures. In the absence of transaction costs, Coase (1937) showed that 
externalities are costly negotiated away, but in the presence of transaction costs then non-
market governance structures were alternatives to the market. Then Coase (1937) asserts 
that when the transaction costs in the market are greater than organising transactions 
inside the firm, then the transaction is organised in the hierarchy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market Hybrid Hierarchy 
Figure 3 Governance structures of Transaction Cost Theory. 
Full exchange of 
property rights 
Constrained transfer:  
(Licensing, JV and Alliance) 
* transfer user rights for set 
time, transfer partial right to 
earn income  
* no transfer of right to 
contract over terms with 
third party, to permanently 
transfer, to modify etc.  
No change in ownership, 
property rights remains 
with the company 
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Transaction cost theory successfully explained why IJVs are formed. Hennart (1993) 
found that most transactions are a mix of markets and hierarchies and therefore the vast 
majority of transactions are governed by hybrid forms, for instance joint ventures, 
alliance, licensing etc. Beamish and Banks (1987: 3) suggest that joint ventures “can 
actually provide a better solution to the problems of opportunism, small numbers 
dilemma and uncertainty in the face of bounded rationality than wholly owned 
subsidiaries”. Hennart (1988) claims joint ventures will be the first-best strategy for 
parents since the high transaction cost in inefficiency intermediate markets. Hence, joint 
ventures constitute the preferred mode of governing economic transactions in situations 
in which they involve lower costs than either markets or hierarchies would entail (Fryxell 
et al. 2002; Ali & Larimo 2011). In the context of international business, it always 
involves uncertainty which certainly adds costs to business transaction. IJVs become the 
most efficient and effective means of reducing uncertainty, since local firm has the 
knowledge of local market. In addition, the nature of IJV permit each party shares the 
equity and asset investment, therefore it is a better way to reduce opportunism than 
market or hierarchy.  
 
Transaction cost theory also gives answer of why IJV control is needed. It suggests that 
there are three characteristics of economic transactions that drive transaction costs, which 
are; asset specificity, transaction frequency, and uncertainty (Williamson 1985). 
Ekanayke (2008) holds that the nature of transaction determines asset specificity, and 
environmental uncertainty is the main components of transaction hazards, which need to 
be controlled in order to achieve better IJV performance. Furthermore, transaction costs 
also arise from human behavioral assumptions of: bounded rationality and opportunism. 
Bounded rationality refers to all possible future contingencies that cannot be foreseen 
(Williamson 1985). In the context of IJV, parents need to set up regulations to obtain 
correct, predictable and critical information on IJV operation in order to protect their 
own interests. Moreover, Ekanayke (2008) assets control is designed to curbing the 
potential opportunistic behaviors of partners in JVs. Geringer and Hebert (1989) hold 
that in the research of control and performance in IJVs, transaction cost theory is one of 
the most helpful theories to clarify and resolve empirical inconsistencies.  
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2.3. Summary 
 
This chapter unfolded with the introduction to the complexity of the concept of IJV 
control.  The organizational control notion is not applicable in IJVs, since there are two 
or more parties joining the IJV management control. The early definition of IJV control 
from structure perspective was found incomplete in IJV performance study, since 
researchers found very different results based on the definition. Although the concept has 
been studied by many scholars, till there is no universal definition of IJV control. This 
study will take the definition of IJV control as “the process by which one partner 
influences, to varying degrees, the behaviour and output of the other partner, through the 
use of power, authority and a wide range of bureaucratic, cultural and informal 
mechanisms.” which most close to this study  (Geringer & Hebert 1989: 236-237).  
 
Three dimensions of control: control mechanisms, control focus and control extent 
provides more comprehensive view of IJV control. It is suggested to jointly examine the 
three dimensions in order to get better understanding of how control affects the 
performance in IJV.  
 
By applying resource dependence theory and transaction cost theory into IJV, we gain 
deeper understanding of the nature of formation of IJV and the importance of control in 
IJV in terms of better performance. Resource dependence theory explains the resources, 
parent firms want to have control in IJV, and in which level they want to control, and 
how they want to control the resources they supply in IJV. It also suggests that IJV 
control structure may change due to the change in parent resources over time. 
Transaction cost theory explains the reasons of IJV formation, controlling the IJV 
activities to reduce cost, and to gain better IJV performance.  
 
 
  
32 
3. CONCEPT OF TRUST IN INTERNATION JOINT VENTURES  
 
This chapter presents the complexity of the concept of trust in IJVs. First, the 
definitions of IJV trust and its dimensions are discussed. Second, the foundation 
theories are discussed to identify the reasons of IJV formation and the importance of 
IJV trust. In the end, the summary of this chapter is presented. 
 
3.1. Conceptualization of IJV trust 
 
Literature on IJV gives significant importance to trust in IJV relationships. Mohr (2004) 
asserts that trust has a positive influence on IJV performance. Robson et al. (2006) 
suggest that lack of trust is the main reason contributing to the IJV failure. Brouthers and 
Bamossy (2006) argue that the success of IJVs may depend on developing trust within 
the IJVs, since trust is an essential component to induce desirable behaviors such as 
knowledge sharing, reduces resistance to knowledge transfer, and increases cooperation 
between individuals and firms. Ren, Gray and Kim (2009) conducted a literature review 
study on antecedents of IJV performance and concluded that trust is a key performance 
diver. Inkpen and Currall (2004) argue that in the context of IJVs, although scholars 
agreed that trust is central to IJVs success, there is limited understanding of the nature 
and mechanisms that firms use to build and maintain trust.” 
 
Rotter (1967: 651) defined trust as “an expectancy held by an individual or a group that 
the word, promise, verbal, or written statement of another individual or group can be 
relied on.” Inkpen and Currall (1998: 3) defined IJV trust as “reliance on another IJV 
party (i.e., person, group, or firm) under a condition of risk. Reliance refers to volitional 
action by one party that allows that the party’s fate to be determined by the other party. 
Risk refers to that a party would experience potentially negative outcomes such as injury 
or loss from the untrustworthiness of the other party.”  
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Mayer et al. (1995: 712) defined trust as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to 
the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a 
particular action important to the turstor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control 
that other party.” This definition views trust as a belief that reflects trustor’s expectations 
that the vulnerability resulting from the acceptance of risk will not be taken advantage by 
the trutee in IJV.  
 
Parkhe (1998) classified some common thoughts of different definitions of trust. He 
argues that trust inherently involves uncertainty about the future. Two types of 
uncertainty involves in alliances: 1) uncertainty regarding future events, and 2) 
uncertainty regarding partner’s responses to those future events. Trust implies 
vulnerability which means the risk of losing something of value. Trust is placed in 
another whose behaviours are not under ones control.  
 
Gargiulo and Ertug (2005) defined trust as a belief that reflects an actor expectation (the 
trustor) about another actor (the trustee). They argue that these expectations should not 
only be based on trustee good intentions towards trustor but also on his ability to honour 
his intentions. The good intentions of trustee refer to “the trustor expects that the trustee 
does not intend to behave opportunistically”. They explain this concept with an example 
that a person may want to honour the trust which trustor places in her/him, but she/he 
may be unable to do so due to circumstances that are beyond her/his control.  
 
According to Gargiulo and Ertug (2005) suggestion, this study prefers more 
comprehensive definition of IJV trust by Boersma, Buckley and Ghauri (2003: 1032). 
According to Boersma, Buckley and Ghauri (2003), trust is: 
“an expectation that a party can be relied on to keep to agreements (promissory), will 
perform its role competently (competence) and that the party will behave honourably 
even where no exploit promises or performance guarantees have been made (good will).” 
The above definition views trust from three perspectives in IJVs. First, trust is a belief 
that the IJV partners will follow their agreement. Second, trust is a belief about the 
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partners’ ability to fulfil the agreement. Third, trust is a believe that the vulnerability 
resulting from the acceptance of risk will not be taken advantage by partners in IJV.   
 
3.1.1 Dimension of Trust 
 
In order to gain deeper understanding of trust, scholars have put the concept of trust into 
different dimensions to analyse its development in IJVs. In an attempt to put the concept 
of trust into dimensions, different scholars have identified different dimensions of trust, 
below table  (Table 2) presents the dimensions of trust from previous studies. 
 
Table 2 Dimensions of trust from previous studies. 
 
Author Year of study Dimension of Trust 
Sako 1992 Contractual-based trust, competence-based 
trust, goodwill-based trust 
Ganesan 1994 Credibility trust, benevolence trust 
Lewicki & Bunker 1996 Calculus-based trust, knowledge-based trust, 
identification-based trust 
Rousseau et al. 1998 Relational trust 
Fryxell et al. 2002 Affect-based trust, cognition-based trust 
Voss et al. 2006 Credibility trust, benevolence trust 
 
 
Sako (1992) makes clear distinctions between three different dimensions of trust in inter-
firm relationships: contractual-based trust, competence-based trust and goodwill-based 
trust. Contractual-based trust refers to “an expectation that a party can be relied upon to 
carry out a verbal or written promise.” Competence-based trust is “an expectation that a 
party will perform its role competently.” Goodwill-based trust is different from the above 
mentioned two kinds of trust, since there are no explicit promises which are expected to 
be fulfilled, and no fixed professional standards to be reached. In goodwill trust, one 
party believes that the other party will behave good towards the their mutual benefits. 
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Ganesan (1994) conceptualize trust using two dimensions: benevolence and credibility.  
In his study, good will-based trust was labelled as benevolence, whereas contractual-
based trust and competence-based trust were combined and labelled as credibility. Voss 
et al. (2006) borrowed these two dimensions and integrated into IJV. They argue that 
benevolence trust refers to the extent to which a firm believes that their partner has 
intentions of goodwill and will behave in a beneficial way to both the IJV and to them 
even when there arise some difficult. Credibility refers to the extent to which a firm 
believes that their partner has the capability to fulfil their duties in IJV.  
 
Lewicki and Bunker (1996) put forward three dimensions of trust: calculus-based trust, 
knowledge-based trust, and identification-based trust. Calculus-based trust is not only 
grounded in vulnerability but also in the benefits to gained from the process of 
relationship development over time. Knowledge-based trust is grounded in the others 
predictability, knowing the other sufficiently well so that others behaviour is predictable. 
Identification-based trust is found on the emotional bonds of care and concern between 
the people. 
 
Fryxell et al. (2002) divide trust into two dimensions, one is affect-based trust, and 
another is cognition-based trust. Affect-based trust refers that people develop emotional 
bonds towards other individuals over time. Cognition-based trust refers that people 
choose whom they will trust, in which respects, and under which circumstances. 
Relational trust (Rousseau et al. 1998) is derived from repeated interactions between 
trustor and trustee in which caring, concern, and emotional attachment have developed.  
 
We can see that there are similarities between the good-will based trust, identification-
based trust, benevolence trust, affect-based trust and relational trust, the trust is 
emotional base on emotional bonds. At same time the similarities also can be found 
between competency-based trust, knowledge based trust, credibility trust and cognition-
based trust, the trust is rational based on evidence. In many studies, these terms are used 
inter-changeably.  
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In this study, we will take the most comprehensive view on the dimensions of trust 
defined by Sako (1992). The three dimensions of trust: contractual-based trust, 
competence-based trust and goodwill-based trust will be used to exam the IJV 
performance. Furthermore, these three dimensions of trust exactly reflect the concept of 
IJV trust, we adopt in this study.  
 
3.2. Foundation theories of IJV trust  
 
Social exchange theory and transaction cost economics have become the most frequently 
used theory to explain the IJV trust (Fryxell et al. 2002; Kauser & Shaw 2004; Brouther 
& Bamossy 2006; Nielsen 2007; Ekanayke 2008). In this section, first introduce social 
exchange theory and then followed transaction cost theory. After that, they are integrated 
and justified for use as foundation theories in this study. 
 
3.2.1 Social exchange theory  
 
Social exchange theory (SET) has recently received a great deal of attentions in inter-
firm relationship researches. For instance manufacture-distributor relationships, supplier-
buyer relationships, exporter-foreign buyer relationships, inter-partner relationships in 
strategic alliance including IJVs (Kwon 2008; Khorassani et al. 2011). 
 
Blau (1964: 91) describes social exchange theory as “voluntary actions of individuals 
that are motivated by the returns they are expected to bring and typically in fact bring 
from others”. According to social exchange theory, trust is the most important key factor 
in relational exchanges. Kwon (2008) argue that trust as a component of social capital 
plays important role in successful inter-firm relationships.  
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Blau (1964) holds that self-interested actors get involve in reciprocal exchange of needed 
resources in an incremental way by demonstrating trust. Khorassani et al. (2011) assert 
social exchange creates trust. They state when one partner provides benefit for the other 
side, they trust that the benefit will be returned. In fact, trust is created through the 
mutual return of actions that benefits the both partners over time. 
 
In terms of social exchange theory in IJV context, Das and Teng (2002) hold that joint 
ventures is a reciprocal exchanges among partner firms with long term duration and 
incomplete contracts and are governed by trust and relationships. Therefore they define 
social exchange theory of joint ventures as firms transact on the basis of trust and its 
sources (Ali and Larimo 2011).  The importance of trust in IJV has been highlighted by 
many scholars. According to Kwon (2008), it is important to build mutual trust and 
commitment, since mutual trust and commitment between partners are essential factors 
resulting cooperative behaviours in inter-firm relationship. They argue that mutual trust 
between partners prevents the opportunistic behaviour, and it reduces the need of control, 
that is reducing transaction costs.  
 
Other scholars argue that trust in IJVs not only can reduce the cost of writing and 
policing contracts, but it also motivates partners to stick to the cooperation when facing 
ambiguity and doubts (Das & Teng 2002; Khorassani et al. 2011). Inkpen and Currall 
(1998) hold that IJV trust is a social property of the IJV relationship It provides the 
social “glue” within which economic exchange occurs, and produce of on-going 
interactions between the partners.  
 
With the presence of trust between IJV partners, each partner shares critical information 
and exerts efforts to understand other partners’ business, which will reduce conflict and 
lead to satisfactory of IJV performance (Kwon 2008). According to Voss et al. (2006), 
trust is an antecedent of quality information exchange, and it leads to more open 
exchange of intellectual capital between firms in international alliance; which means that 
trust facilitates the sharing the confidential information.  
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By applying social exchange theory into IJVs, we gain deeper understanding of the 
importance of trust in IJV. It also gives clear idea about how trust is produced through 
the exchange between partners. According to social exchange theory, in order to achieve 
satisfactory IJV performance, mutual trust needs to be built between partners. 
 
 3.2.2 Transaction cost theory 
 
As discussed in previous chapter that the basic of transaction cost theory is about relative 
choice of governance structure depending on two behaviour assumptions: bounded 
rationality and threat of opportunism (Williamson 1975, 1985, 1991). In international 
business context, transaction cost theory predicts that firms entering markets involved 
high investment risks, in order to reduce their exposure to these risks, firms prefer IJV 
modes over wholly owned modes (Neilsen 2007).  
 
However, one of the characteristic of an IJV is shared ownership, which creates key 
problems in IJV. According to Boersma, Buckley and Ghauri (2003), shared control over 
the strategies and operations brings increased transaction cost. They argue that 
transaction cost consist of ex-ante and ex-post elements.  Ex-ante transaction cost refers 
to the cost before the events such as drafting, negotiating and safeguarding an agreement. 
Ex-post transaction costs are more complex and difficult to quantifiable. Ex-post 
transaction cost include: 1) the adaptation costs, 2) the haggling costs, 3) the set-up cost 
and running costs associated with the governance structures, and 4) the bonding cost of 
effecting secure commitments. They mention that presence of trust is important in IJVs, 
since trust is a transaction-cost-reducing mechanism that lowers the subjective risk of 
entering into an agreement, that is both ex ante and ex post transaction cost are reduced 
by trust. Brouthers and Bamossy (2006) hold that the trust can influence the cost 
associated with monitoring and controlling the actions of partner originations, that is 
reducing ex-post transaction costs.  
 
Opportunistic is a key behaviour assumption in transaction cost theory (Williamson 
1985). In the context of IJVs, scholars have recognised that opportunism is the 
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fundamental problem in IJVs causing IJV failure (Das & Teng 2001; Ekanayke 2008). 
To protect from opportunisms behaviour in IJV, research has highlighted the importance 
of trust. So, trust is another factor along control reducing opportunistic behaviour in IJVs 
(Fryxell et al 2002; Brouthers & Bamossy 2006; Ekanayke 2008). Kauser and Shaw 
(2004) also argue that the transaction cost can be reduced by deterring opportunistic 
behaviours in international strategic alliances.  
 
3.3. Summary 
 
The importance of trust in IJV has been pointed in previous studies. Trust in IJVs has 
received great deal of attention from scholars, and different definitions of trust have been 
developed. However, there is still lack of universal definition of trust in IJV. This study 
will take more comprehensive definition of IJV trust developed by Boersma, Buckley 
and Ghauri (2003: 1032). According to them, trust is “an expectation that a party can be 
relied on to keep to agreements (promissory), will perform its role competently 
(competence) and that the party will behave honourably even where no exploit promises 
or performance guarantees have been made (good will).”  
 
These different dimensions of trust are developed to explain trust in IJV. These 
dimensions of trust are similar to trust dimensions put forward by Sako (1992). 
Therefore we will rely on trust dimensions identified by Sako (1992) and Boersma, 
Buckley and Ghauri (2003). These dimensions are contractual-based trust, competence-
based trust and goodwill-based trust. These dimensions will be used to identify their 
relation with IJV performance. 
 
Social exchange theory explains the importance of trust in social exchange and how trust 
is produced through the exchange. IJV trust is a social property of the IJV relationship, 
and it provides the social “glue” within which economic exchange occurs, and produce 
of on-going interactions between the partners. According to the social exchange theory, 
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there is need to produce mutual trust between partners in order to achieve better IJV 
performance. 
 
Transaction cost theory not only explains the nature of formation of IJV, but also the 
need of trust in IJV in terms of successful operation. Trust in IJV can reduce both ex anta 
and ex post transaction cost, and it also can protect from opportunism.  
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4. INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE 
 
The goal of this chapter is to conceptualize the performance in IJV. Firstly, the meaning 
of performance in IJVs and its measurements are discussed. Secondly, the impact of 
control on IJV performance is proposed based on previous studies. Thirdly, the impact of 
trust on IJV performance is discussed by analyzing the extant studies. In the end, the 
summary of this chapter is presented, and the proposed conceptual framework is 
presented. 
 
4.1 The complexity of IJV performance and Measurement 
 
Researchers have noted that many IJVs are not successful (Brouther & Bamossy 2006; 
Nippa, Beechler & Klossek 2007; Nguyen & Larimo 2009). Glaister and Buckley (1998) 
hold that firms often depict dissatisfaction with IJV performance. As a result, IJV 
performance received great attention from scholars. For instance, Larimo (2002) 
reviewed 80 empirical studies focusing on the analysis of IJV performance in order to 
find out the key determinants of IJV performance. Selekler-goksen and Uysal-tezolmez 
(2007) conducted empirical study focusing on IJV performance in Turkey. Ren, Gray 
and Kim (2009) reviewed previous empirical studies IJV performance and identified 
different performance measurements in IJV. See appendix 2 for IJV performance 
measures used in previous studies. 
 
Mohr (2004) states that most of researchers agree that IJV performance is a multivariate 
construct that cannot be represented by one single indicator, and it is impossible to have 
a universal definition. Furthermore, each party in the IJV may also have their own 
criteria for performance evaluation, since they have different motivation to form the IJV.  
Even, the measurement of performance in a single organization is a controversial area, 
since there is no clarification between indicators of performance and determinates of 
performance. This difficulty of measuring performance is exacerbated in IJVs because of 
number of parties involved in IJV. Therefore, there is no consensus on appropriate 
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definition of IJV performance and its measurement (Geringer & Hebert 1989; Glaister & 
Buckley 1998).  
 
Previous studies on IJV performance have greatly relied on two methods for measuring 
IJV performance. The first method is objective measurement, which includes a variety of 
traditional financial indicators, such as profitability, growth and cost position, survival, 
duration of IJV, renegotiation of the IJV contract, and etc. (Glaister & Buckley 1998; 
Nielsen 2007; Ren, Gray & Kim 2009).  Scholars argue that this method may be good at 
explaining the past performance of IJVs. But, this method fails to reflect the long term 
objectives of IJVs. Glaister and Buckley (1998) note that IJVs may be intended to 
achieve certain objectives, such as market presence, and learning rather than standard 
financial objectives. Meanwhile, an IJV is considered as unsuccessful despite good 
financial results. Therefore, taking only financial output as IJV performance measure is 
incomplete.  
 
The second measuring method of IJV performance is subjective measurement. It refers 
to measure parent’s satisfaction with IJV performance (Killing 1983; Glaister & Buckley 
1998; Nielsen 2007), and the achieving strategic goals set for IJV (Yan & Gray 1994). 
Yan and Gray (2001) suggested that financial measure such as profit, market share and 
growth are relatively meaningless for new IJVs in the Chinese market. Their study of 
Chinese-U.S IJVs shows that the partners have different strategic interests. Chinese firms 
want to acquire technological, managerial expertise, but U.S firms are interested in 
market share, and access to distribution channels. Thus, we can see that subjective 
measures hold the same importance as objective measures in IJV performance.  
 
Glaister and Buckley (1998) reviewed the IJV performance measures used in previous 
studies and identified the following three inconsistencies; 1) measuring performance of 
IJV from whose perspective, host parent, home parent? 2) measuring performance 
through objective perception or subjective perception? 3). the appropriateness of 
different performance measures changes as a JV matures. Larimo (2002) argues that 
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while defining IJV performance, future research should differentiate between IJV’s own 
performance, and its performance towards IJV partners. 
 
To enrich our understandings of IJV performance, present study defines IJV performance 
as the performance of the operation itself. Present study looks at both partners’ 
perspective on their IJV performance rather than only taking one partner’s perspective. 
Therefore, this study will exam both partners’ satisfaction of IJV performance through 
both objective and subjective perceptions.  Objective measure of financial output and 
subjective measure of overall satisfaction with IJV performance, and goal achievement 
will be taken into consideration for examining the IJV performance in present study.  
 
4.2 Impact of control on IJV performance 
 
Prior studies have highlighted the importance of control in IJV success (Geringer & 
Hebert 1991; Glaister & Buckley 1998; Child &Yan 1999; Boersma et al. 2003; Brouthers 
& Bamossy 2006; Nguyen & Larimo 2009). According to Geringer and Hebert (1989), 
three dimensions of control; that is, control mechanisms, control focus, and control 
extent should be jointly examined in order to get better understanding of how control 
affects the performance of IJVs.  
 
Control mechanisms 
Control mechanisms are defined as “structural arrangements deployed to determine and 
influence what members of an organization do” (Fryxell 2002:868). Prior studies have 
suggested two types of control mechanisms in IJV: formal control and informal control 
(Das & Teng 2001; Fryxell 2002; Jagd 2010). In the following, I will discuss the 
importance of control mechanisms for IJV performance. 
 
Fryxell, Dooley and Vryza (2002) conducted a study focusing on the relationship 
between control mechanisms and IJV performance. Their study found that formal control 
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is needed for both partners and it is positively related to the performance of younger IJVs. 
Further, they found that social control (informal control) is positively related to IJV 
performance. Their study is comprised of following performance measures; financial 
output, return on equity, operating costs, and production processes, marketing and sales, 
technology and customer service. Brouther and Bamossy (2006: 220) discussed the 
process of IJV management relationships. They found that in successful IJVs, foreign 
parents gradually develop trust and increased formal control over time. 
 
Nippa, Beechler and Klossek (2007) reviewed the literature on IJV performance, and 
success factors of IJV performance. They found that previous research has widely used 
both objective measures (i.e., return on investment, return on assets, market share, and 
sales) and subjective measures (i.e., success of foreign entities) to measure IJV 
performance. Further, they found that equity ownership has positively impact on IJV 
performance. As discussed previously, foreign parent firms often favour ownership 
equity as the main control mechanism in IJVs (Glaister & Buckley 1998; Child & Yan 
1999; Fryxell et al. 2002; Kauser & Shaw 2004; Selekler-goksen & Uysal-tezolmez 
2007).  
 
According to Nguyen and Larimo (2009), the choice of IJV control mechanisms (formal 
vs informal control mechanisms) vary with the motives of IJV formation and have 
different impacts on IJV performance. They found that foreign firms forming IJV for 
gaining local resources use informal control mechanism which positively relates to 
financial and overall performance of IJVs. Further, they found that foreign parent firms 
forming IJV for gaining economies of scale and scope use formal control mechanism 
which positively relates to financial and overall performance of IJVs. 
 
Contrary to above studies, Ekanayke`s (2008) study depicts that informal control 
positively relates to IJV performance, but formal control mechanisms negatively relate to 
IJV performance. Similarly, Kauser and Shaw (2002) found that formal control 
mechanisms negatively relate to strategic alliance performance, but informal control 
mechanisms positively relate to strategic alliance performance. 
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These studies depict that there is vast consensus among IJV scholars that informal 
control positively relates to IJV performance. Contrary to that, above studies depict 
diversified results about the relationship between formal control mechanisms and IJV 
performance. But, based on Fryxell, Dooley and Vryza (2002), Brouther and Bamossy 
(2006: 220), and Nippa, Beechler and Klossek (2007), I conclude that formal control 
mechanism also positively relates to IJV performance. The discussion above leads us to 
following propositions: 
 
P1. Control mechanisms are positively related to (1a) IJV financial output, (1b) overall 
satisfaction, and (1c) goal achievement. 
 
Control focus 
Control focus refers to the areas of the IJV’s operation in which control is exercised. 
According to Geringer and Hebert (1989), parents can choose to have broad control 
focus or narrow control focus over IJVs.  Nguyen and Larimo (2009) suggest that the 
most critical area which parent firm’s focus on control in IJV include 1) marketing, sales, 
distribution, 2) procurement, 3) general management and operation, 4) finance and 
accounting, 5) research and development 6) production and quality, and 7) human 
resources.   
 
In terms of financial output in IJVs, Kauser and Shaw (2002) found that the focus of 
control over functional activities is positively correlated with profitability and alliance 
satisfaction in terms of sales growth. 
 
According to Glaister and Buckley (1998: 243), “parents who dominate or have 
responsibility for management control will have a higher perceived level of satisfaction 
of IJV performance than those parents who do not dominate or have responsibility for 
management control”. In their study, two objective performance measures of IJV 
survival and the duration of the IJV, and one subjective performance measure of overall 
satisfaction were used. 
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The study of Yan and Gray (2001) shows that the partner exercising a higher level of 
operational control over the IJV achieve more of its strategic objectives than the partner 
using lesser control. Similarly, Williamson (1975) argues that gaining management 
control over an IJV is one way to ensure the one’s strategic objective are actively 
pursued.  
 
Based on above discusses, it is expected that control focus has positive relation with IJV 
performance. This leads us to following proposition:  
P2. Control focus is positively related to (2a) IJV financial output, (2b) overall 
satisfaction, and (2c) goal achievement. 
 
Control extent 
According to Geringer and Hebert (1989), control extent refers to the tightness of control 
which is exercised. Tight control gives the partner with high degree of certainty that 
personnel in the IJV will act according to the partner’s wish. Previous studies show the 
relationship between the extent of control and JV performance.  
 
According to Nippa, Beechler and Klossek (2007), tight control in particular by foreign 
parents, has a significant positive impact on IJV performance. Their study is comprised 
of both objective and subjective performance measures, such as return on investment, 
market share and sale, return on assets, mangers perceptions of the success of the IJVs. 
However, study by Kauser and Shaw (2002) did not find any relation between the extent 
of control and satisfaction of international strategic alliances. 
 
Selekler-Göksen and Uysal-Tezölmez (2007) conducted a study on Turkish IJVs. They 
found that the extent of control affects financial output, but they did not find relation 
between extent of control and goal achievement. Similarity, Child and Yan (2003) also 
found that higher degree of control by foreign parent does not lead to significantly better 
goal achievement performance. 
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As discusses above, we expect control extent have positive relation with financial output 
and overall satisfaction in IJV. Further, we expect that there is no relation between the 
control extent and goal achievement in IJVs. The above discussion leads us to following 
proposition: 
 P3. Control extent is positively related to (3a) IJV financial output and (3b) overall 
satisfaction, but (3c) is not related to goal achievement. 
 
4.3. Impact of trust on IJV performance  
 
The importance of trust in IJV has been pointed in previous studies (Fryxell et al.2002; 
Boersma, Buckley & Ghauri 2003; Kauser & Shaw 2004; Mohr 2004; Brouthers & 
Bamossy 2006; Robson et al. 2006; Nielsen 2007; Ekanayke 2008; Ren, Gray & Kim 
2009). In terms of relation between IJV trust and IJV performance, three dimensions of 
IJV trust are brought into examination: contractual-based trust, competence-based trust 
and goodwill-based trust. 
 
Contractual-based Trust 
According to Sako (1992), “contractual trust is the trust between the partners to ensure 
adherence to the specific written or oral agreements.”  It is an expectation that a party 
can be relied upon to carry out their contractual obligations.   
 
Ng, Lau and Nyaw (2007) found that the level of trust (comprising contractual trust and 
goodwill trust) between IJV parents is positively related to IJV performance. Sako (1992) 
also found that contractual trust positively relates to the performance of buyer-seller 
relationships. In the same vein, Boersma et al. (2003) found that contractual trust 
positively relates to the performance of European IJVs. Sako and Helper (1998) also 
found that contractual trust positively relates to the performance in buyer-seller 
relationships. 
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Although, contractual based trust is an important dimension of trust, but previous 
research is limited on the relationship between contractual trust and IJV performance. 
Based on Ng, Lau and Nyaw (2007), Sako (1992), and Boersma et al. (2003), we 
conclude that contractual trust positively relates to IJV performance. This discussion 
leads us to the following proposition: 
P4. Contractual-based trust is positively related to (4a) IJV financial output and (4b) 
overall satisfaction, and (4c) goal achievement. 
 
Competence-based trust 
Competence-based trust is the belief that one partner believes that the other partner has 
certain competences to fulfil their obligations (Sako 1992). As we discussed previously, 
there are similarities between competence-based trust, credibility trust and cognition-
based trust. This dimension of trust is more rational in nature and needs evidence about 
the competences of partner firm (Das & Teng 2001; Mohr 2004; Jadg 2010). 
 
Scholars suggest that competence based trust has positive implications for reducing 
transaction costs and enhancing performance, since the existence of trust can reduce the 
costs of opportunism and improve IJV performance (Fryxell et al. 2002; Brouthers & 
Bamossy 2006). Similarly, Das and Teng (2001) argue that competence trust reduces 
perceived performance risk, and one’s competence suggests a high probability of getting 
things accomplished successfully. 
 
According to Mohr (2004), competence trust has positive relationship with IJV 
performances. In his study, performance was measured by using subjective measures of 
satisfaction of partner firms with IJV performance, and achievement of IJV objectives. 
The managers were asked to evaluate the extent to which they saw their respective 
partner firms’ goals as achieved, and their satisfaction regarding profitability, growth, 
market share, technological level, and stability of the IJV etc. Similarly, Voss et al. (2006) 
found that competence trust and quality of information positively interact and together 
have positive impact on the performance of IJVs. In the same vein, Muthusamy et al. 
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(2007) found that competence trust has a direct positive effect on the achievement of 
financial goals in IJVs 
 
As reviewed from previous studies, it is expected that competence trust has positive 
impact on the performance of IJVs. Based on the discussion, we develop the following 
proposition: 
P5. Competence-based trust is positively related to (5a) IJV financial output and (5b) 
overall satisfaction, and (5c) goal achievement. 
 
Goodwill-based Trust 
Goodwill-based trust is distinct from other two dimensions of trust, since there are no 
explicit promises which are expected to be fulfilled and no fixed professional standards 
to be reached. It is based on the partners’ intentions for the long-term existence of the 
relationship (Sako 1992). The similarities have been found between the good-will based 
trust, identification-based trust, benevolence trust, affect-based trust and relational trust. 
This dimension of trust is more emotional based (Das & Teng 2001; Mohr 2004; Jagd 
2010). 
 
According to Das and Teng (2001), goodwill trust reduces the perceived likelihood of 
opportunistic behavior occurring in IJVs, reduces transaction costs, and increases IJV 
performance. Brouthers and Bamossy (2006) proposed that the greater goodwill-based 
trust leads to higher IJV performance. 
 
Mohr (2004) found that goodwill trust has positive impact on IJV performances. His 
study comprises of objective and subjective IJV performance. Objective performance 
comprise of “hard performance measures”, which refers to profitability, growth, market 
share etc., and “soft performance measures”, which refers to technological level, stability 
of the JV, and the competitiveness of IJV. Subjective IJV performance comprises of 
satisfaction with goal achievement, and satisfaction with both “hand” and “soft” 
performance measures in IJV. 
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According to Kauser and Shaw (2002), trust between alliance partners positively relates 
to international strategic alliance performance and manager’s satisfaction. They found 
that a higher level of trust between partners brings better alliance performance. In the 
same vein, Ekanayke (2008) proposed that there is positive relationship between 
goodwill trust and IJV performance. Similarly, Nielsen’s (2007) study on Danish IJVs 
found that goodwill trust is directly related to relational equity, financial performance, 
and efficiency. 
 
Based on above discussion, it is clear that there is vast literature on the positive 
relationship between goodwill trust and IJV performance. Based on this, we develop the 
following proposition: 
P6. Goodwill-based trust is positively related to (6a) IJV financial output and (6b) overall 
satisfaction, and (6c) goal achievement. 
 
4.4. Summary 
 
IJV performance is a multivariate construct that cannot be represented by one single 
indicator, and it is impossible to have a universal definition. Each party may also have 
their own criteria for performance evaluation, since they have different motivation to 
form the IJV. Not only the definition of IJV performance is challenging, but the 
measurement of IJV performance is also problematic, since there is no clarification 
between indicators of performance and determinates of performance (Geringer & Hebert 
1989; Glaister & Buckley 1998).  
 
However, the prior studies have suggested for two performance measurement in IJVs: 
objective measurement and subjective measurement. Objective measurement focuses on 
a variety of financial indicators, which are good at explaining the past performance of 
IJVs, but it fails to reflect the long term objectives of IJV (Glaister & Buckley 1998; 
Nielsen 2007; Ren, Gray & Kim 2009). Subjective measurement intend to measure 
parent’s satisfaction with IJV performance and the goal achievement of parent firms 
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(Killing 1983; Glaister & Buckley 1998; Nielsen 2007). Since the objective of IJV 
formation may be different for parent firms, therefore relying simultaneously on 
subjective and objective measures would be more appropriate way to analyse IJV 
performance than relying on one measurement. 
 
The following table 3 comprises of the propositions on the role of control and trust for 
IJV performance.  
 
Table 3 List of Propositions. 
 
 
Impact of control on IJV performance 
 
Impact of trust on IJV performance 
P1. Control mechanisms are positively related 
to (1a) IJV financial output, (1b) overall 
satisfaction, and (1c) goal achievement. 
 
P4. Contractual-based trust is positively related to (4a) 
IJV financial output and (4b) overall satisfaction, and 
(4c) goal achievement. 
 
P2. Control focus is positively related to (2a) 
IJV financial output, (2b) overall satisfaction, 
and (2c) goal achievement. 
 
P5. Competence-based trust is positively related to (5a) 
IJV financial output and (5b) overall satisfaction, and 
(5c) goal achievement. 
P3. Control extent is positively related to (3a) 
IJV financial output and (3b) overall 
satisfaction, but (3c) is not related to goal 
achievement. 
 
P6. Goodwill-based trust is positively related to (6a) 
IJV financial output and (6b) overall satisfaction, and 
(6c) goal achievement. 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical Framework: 
 
The proposed theoretical framework is depicted in Figure 4 below. In the framework, 
performance is posited as the dependent variable, and IJV control and IJV trust are 
posted as independent variables having positive effects on IJV performance. 
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In recent year, researchers have focused on the inter-relationship between trust and 
control in alliances (Das & Teng 2001; Fryxell et al 2002; Mohr 2007; Ekanayke 2008). 
Some authors (Long & Sitkin 1995; Bhattacharya et al. 1998) have agreed that there is 
positive relationship between trust and control, they argue control is a mechanism to 
document trustful behavior and it also leads to trust. For example, Long and Sitkin (1995) 
argue that set up rules, regulations and standards facilitate the development of trust in 
organizations. Bhattacharya et al. (1998) stress that establishment of reporting 
mechanism allows partners to check the actual situation of the cooperation whether it is 
as they expected. Ekanayke (2008) claims there is a positive relationship between trust 
and informal control.  Another group of authors believe that there is a negative 
relationship between trust and control (Inkpen & Currall 1998; Das & Teng 2001). 
 
Please note: N.R means that there is no relationship. 
Figure 4 Proposed theoretical framework. 
 
P (1) + 
P (2) + 
P (6) + 
P (5) + 
P (4) + 
P (3a) + 
P (3b) + 
P (3c) N.R 
Control 
mechanisms 
Control 
 focus 
Control  
extent 
Goodwill  
trust 
Competence 
trust 
Contractual 
trust 
IJV 
Control 
IJV 
Trust 
 
IJV  
performance 
Financial output 
Overall satisfaction 
Goal achievement 
53 
In addition to those two opinions, Mohr (2007) argue that there is another possibility, 
that there is no relation between trust and control in IJV. He proposed three types of 
relationships between trust and control in IJVs: 1). there is no relation between trust and 
control, 2).there is positive relation between trust and control and 3), there is negative 
relation between trust and control. Although the empirical result did not support any of 
the proposed relationship, but his study provides us more comprehensive view of the 
relation between trust and control in IJV. 
 
However, based on the above discussion, I conclude that there are three possible types of 
relationship between trust and control: 1). there is no relation between trust and control, 
2).there is positive relation between trust and control and 3), there is negative relation 
between trust and control. 
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5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY    
 
This chapter explains the methodology used in the present study. It opens up with the 
discussion of research method, case study research, criticism and benefits of case study 
research. Furthermore, case study design for the present study is explained. Finally, the 
validity and reliability of the study is discussed. 
 
5.1. Research method   
 
The research methodology of this study reflects the principles of interpretivism as this 
study focuses upon the details of situation by finding the reality behind these details. The 
role of theory in this study is deduction, since resource dependence theory, transaction 
cost economics, and social exchange theories are used to build propositions. The 
developed propositions propose a relationship between specific variables (i.e, control 
mechanisms, control focus, control extent, contractual trust, competence trust, goodwill 
trust, and IJV performance) and enable the facts to be measured in the selected method.  
 
There are different approaches which can be used in a research phenomenon, and all the 
approaches offer an alternative view of the research object. Therefore, it is the author’s 
responsibility to choose the most suitable approach according to the objective of study. 
In business studies, researchers adopt two main research approaches: quantitative and 
qualitative research.   
 
There are lots of disputes about the value of quantitative and qualitative research, known 
as the paradigm wars. Quantitative research uses experimental methods and aims to test 
hypothetical generalizations for a large sample size. This method is a systematic research 
method with a structured approach. Quantitative approach is used to measure and explain 
the phenomenon by statistical analysis of the collected data and it has little flexibility. 
Researchers often use this method when their objective is to get answers to the questions 
like how many, how often, how much etc. (Yin 2010) 
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Qualitative approach uses a naturalistic approach and aims to gather deep insight to the 
subjective. Qualitative research represents the views and perspectives of the people by 
covering the contextual conditions. It contributes insights into existing or emerging 
concepts by striving to use multiple sources of evidence rather than relying on a single 
source alone. It also refers to several methods of data collection and represents higher 
flexibility than quantitative research. The method gives answer to the questions such as 
what, why and how. (Yin 2010) 
 
In this study, the qualitative approach has been chosen as research method rather than 
quantitative approach. Since the research objective is to study how control and trust 
impact on IJV performance in China? The qualitative approach gives the opportunity to 
explore the phenomenon under study. 
 
5.2 Case study research 
 
Case study is one of the traditional qualitative methods with special research strategy and 
approach. It is an empirical research method, which examines a contemporary 
phenomenon in a real life situation. The benefit of using case study is that the case 
represents new insights into the subject under investigation. In addition, case study 
method may involve different ways of gathering information, which enhances the 
reliability of the study. However, there are also disadvantages of using case study. For 
instance, researchers cannot create scientific generalizations of the results of the case 
study. Further, using case study as a research method takes lots of time and produces 
massive amounts of documents. In conclusion, case study method has its benefits as well 
disadvantages. However, if the researcher is aware of them, it is possible to increase the 
reliability and validity of the case study. (Yin 2003) 
 
Three factors are needed to be taken into consideration when choosing case study as 
study method. These factors are; research question, control over behavioral events, and 
focus on contemporary events (Yin 2003). In terms of the current study, the research 
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question is “how control and trust impacts on the IJV performance in China?” According 
to Yin (2003: 5) case study research is best for answering “how” and “why” questions. 
So, based on the nature of research question, the choice of case study is justifiable. 
Furthermore, control over behavioral events is not possible in this study as this study is 
not a controlled experiment in a laboratory. In addition, the focus of this study is on 
contemporary events, meaning that I will be investigating the current relationships 
between IJV partners, not the previous relationships between IJV partners. In conclusion, 
case study is the most suitable research method for this study. 
 
5.3 Case study design 
 
The design of a case study consists of four parts: study questions, units of analysis, data 
collection, and analysis of case study evidence (Yin 1994: 20).  The research design of 
this study is presented according to the four parts in following section. 
 
Firstly, the research objective was identified for the present study based on my interest in 
research topic. The main study question is “how control and trust impact on international 
joint venture performance in China?” 
 
Further, in case study, an important decision is to choose the number of cases. A case 
study can be either single or multiple case study. According to Yin (2003), multiple case 
study findings are more convincing than single case study. This study will take 8 case 
companies. The objective of choosing four case companies is to compare the findings 
across the cases. 
 
The next important question is about data collection. For this study interviews will be 
conducted as the main method to collect data. There are three types of interviews: 
structured, semi structured and unstructured. Structured interviews limit the responses 
from participants, which may not reflect the truth of the situation. Unstructured 
57 
interviews allow the participants to talk freely, which may spend lots of time and gather 
lots of invaluable information. Semi structured interviews use an interview guide. It 
consists of questions outline on the areas that should be covered.  It gives the space for 
participants to answer freely on specific areas (Saunders et al. 2007). Face to face 
interviews and telephone interviews will be conducted with a semi structured interview 
questionnaire (See appendix 1).  In addition, other sources of data will be used in this 
study. For instance, the website of the company and company annual reports will be used 
to collect background information of case companies.  
 
In this study, to interpret qualitative data, Marschan-Piekkari and Welch (2004: 571) 
guide that there are different ways of analysing the qualitative data. The purpose of 
analysing the qualitative data in this study is to describe the findings through thick 
description, quotations and references to the interviewees’ opinions.  
 
5.4. Validity and reliability   
 
In a qualitative study, validity is about the closeness of what we believe we are 
measuring to what we intended to measure (Roberts et al 2006). Validity is assessed in 
terms of how well the research tools measure the phenomena under investigation. 
Interview is a common method of data collection in qualitative research, and the validity 
of the interview data needs to be considered.   In this study, both open questions and 
multiple choice questions were used to double confirm the accurate of interviewees’ 
opinions. For Chinese parent companies, the questionnaire was translated into Chinese to 
avoid any misunderstanding.  Validity can be achieved through the accuracy in the 
process of analysis and interpretation. In this study, it is achieved by the analysis method 
involving direct quotations of the opinions of the interviewees and statistical analysis of 
the answers of the multiple choice question.  
 
The reliability of a study means, that in case a later investigator follows exactly the same 
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procedures as described by an earlier investigator and conducts the same case study all 
over again, the later investigator should arrive at the same findings and conclusions (Yin 
2003: 37). In this study, there are 8 case companies covering Sino-British joint ventures 
in 1990s, 2000s and 2010. The interviewees have been engaged with the establishment of 
their joint ventures, they have good knowledge about their joint ventures.  However, 
regarding the concept and level of control and trust, the interviewees may have different 
opinions; the results of this study are based on subjective evaluation of situations by the 
respondent. Furthermore, the result is also subjective interpretation of the results by the 
author, so the results can vary if the interviewees and the author are different. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
6． EMPIRICAL FINDINGS  
 
This chapter mainly discusses the empirical findings. It opens up with the introduction of 
case companies. Next discuss the meaning of control and trust in IJV of case company.   
Furthermore, present the British parent perspective of the impact of control and trust in 
IJV. Finally, present the Chinese parent perspective of the impact of control and trust in 
IJV. 
 
6.1. Introduction to the case companies  
 
Eight case companies have been studied, 4 Chinese parent companies of Sino-British 
joint ventures and 4 British parent companies of Sino-British joint ventures. The industry 
of all their joint ventures is manufacturing and exporting. 
 
Case Company 1 (Chinese) located in Ningbo, China. The company has 350 employees 
and main products of the company are pneumatic components, DC series air source 
treatment, AC Series FRL, fitting, and tube etc. The company did not have any joint 
venture before this joint venture in China. This joint venture was established as partial 
acquisition in 1993. The main products of this joint venture are same as their product but 
with new technology.  There is one British partner engaged in this joint venture that 
holds 50 % share and the Chinese company holds 50% share. 
 
Case Company 2 (Chinese) located in Guangzhou, China. The company has 450 
employees and main product and service of this company is electrical components, OEM 
service, and sourcing service. The company did not have any joint venture before this 
joint venture in China. The joint venture was established as Greenfield in 2001. The main 
products of this joint venture are hand-dryer, elevator components and electronic 
components. There are two British partners engaged in this joint venture, they hold 25% 
each equity share and the Chinese company holds 50% equity share. 
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Case Company 3 (Chinese) located in Ningbo, China. The company has 300 employees 
and main products of the company are earth augers. The company did not have any joint 
venture before this joint venture in China. The joint venture was established as partial 
acquisition in 2009. The main products of this joint venture are earth augers and 
trenching attachments with new technology.  There is one British partner engaged in this 
joint venture that holds 51% share and the Chinese company holds 49% share. 
 
Case Company 4 (Chinese) located in Jiangsu, China. Total area of 2000 acres, employs 
nearly 5,000 people. It is a private enterprise group specializing in rail transportation, 
CNC equipment, office equipment, wind power generation equipment, logistics and 
other five core businesses. The company had a joint venture before this joint venture in 
China. This joint venture was established as Greenfield in 2010. The main product of this 
joint venture is gear box. There is one British partner engaged in this joint venture, the 
British firm holds 50% equity share and the Chinese company holds 50% equity share. 
 
Case Company 5 (British) located in Oxford, UK. The main product of this company is 
hand dryer. The company did not have any joint venture experience before this joint 
venture in China. The joint venture was established as Greenfield in 2001. The main 
products of this joint venture are hand-dryer, elevator components and electronic 
components. There is another British partner (British case 2) and one Chinese partner 
engaged in this joint venture, the Chinese partner holds 50% equity share and another 
British partner holds 25% equity share, this British company holds 25%  equity share. 
 
Case Company 6 (British) located in London, UK. The main service of this company is 
business solution service. The company did not have any joint venture experience before 
this joint venture in China. The joint venture was established as Greenfield in 2001. The 
main products of this joint venture are hand-dryer, elevator components and electronic 
components. There is another British partner (British Case 1) and one Chinese partner 
engaged in this joint venture, the Chinese partner holds 50% equity share and another 
British partner holds 25% equity share, this British company holds 25% equity share. 
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Case Company 7 (British) located in London, UK. The main service of this company is 
design and manufacturing children cloth. The company did not have any joint venture 
experience before this joint venture in China. The joint venture was established as 
Greenfield in 2002. The main products of this joint venture are children series. There is 
one Chinese partner engaged in this joint venture, the Chinese partner holds 49% equity 
share and this British company holds 51% equity share. 
 
Case Company 8 (British) located in Washington, Type & Wear, UK. The main products 
of this company include fireproof wiring, trace heating, petrochemical, and 
thermocouples. The company does not have any joint venture experience before this joint 
venture in China. The joint venture was established as Greenfield in 2009. The main 
products of this joint venture are same as above. There is one Chinese partner engaged in 
this joint venture, the Chinese partner holds 49% equity share and this British company 
holds 51% equity share. 
 
Table 4 Summary of case companies. 
Case 
Parent 
Country  
Goals of  
forming JV 
Main Product share 
Partner 
no 
Venture 
establishe
d 
Venture  
age 
Case 1 China 
1.To learn new technology   
2.To earn profit 
pneumatic 
components/ 
50% 1 1993 19 
Case 2 China 
1.To learn new technology  
2.To earn profit  3.To open 
UK market 
Hand-dryer, elevator 
components/electronic 
components 
50% 2 2001 11 
Case 3 China 
1.To learn new technology 
2.To earn profit 
Earth augers & 
Trenching 
Attachments 
49% 1 2009 14 
Case 4 China 
1.To learn new technology 
2.To open UK market 
Gear box/Systems  50% 1 2010 2 
Case 5 UK 
1.To earn profit,  
2.To achieve low cost 
sourcing 
Hand-dryer, elevator 
components/electronic 
components 
25% 2 2001 11 
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6.2. Empirical findings of control and trust in IJV  
 
Control in IJV 
Empirical findings show that both Chinese and British parents firms try to take control 
over their JVs, they think control is basic and important thing to do in a JV. Findings 
confirm the importance of control and the needs of control in IJV.  The Chinese manager 
from Chinese case 1 motioned: 
“We do need control to ensure the smoothly operation and development of our JV.” 
British manager from case company 7 emphasized: 
“We must control our JV in order to achieve our goals, and we must know what happens 
there.” 
Another British manager from case company 8 says: 
“We need to control since we do not want to lose our technology advantage.” 
Result shows parent firms all used different formal and informal control mechanisms 
over JVs, and they all focused on certain areas which they think are very important for 
them. In terms of tightness of control, both Chinese and British parent firms exercise 
quite tightness control over their JVs. 
Case 6 UK 
1. To earn profit, 
2.Looking for other 
business opportunities in 
China 
Hand-dryer, elevator 
components/electronic 
components 
25% 2 2001 11 
Case 7 UK 
1. To earn profit, 2.To 
access local market.  
3.  To achieve low cost 
sourcing 
children cloth series 51% 1 2008 4 
Case 8 UK 
1. To increase local market 
share,  
2. To achieve low cost 
sourcing 
3. To earn profit 
fireproof wiring, trace 
heating, petrochemical, 
thermocouples 
51% 1 2009 3 
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Control mechanisms 
Result shows both parents firm used major formal control mechanisms such as holding 
major equity share, venture board representation, appointment of key venture person and 
exercising vote right. Findings show that 6 case companies expected to have more than 
50% equity share, and the companies have more than 50% equity share also appointed 
the key venture person for the JV, and every case company used venture board 
representation and exercising vote right control mechanisms in their JV. 
 
Both Chinese and British parent firms used major informal control mechanisms 
including training of venture manager, interaction, informal socialization such as phone 
call and outdoor activities over their JV. In addition to these control mechanisms, the 
British manager from case company 5 says: 
“We regularly visit our JV in China, focus on quality control and overall operation audit, 
and we also organize inward studies of technology and process.” 
 
Control Focus 
Result shows that both Chinese and British parent firms are control focused on financing 
and accounting and quality. And the reason is that most parent firms form JV to earn 
more profit, financing and accounting area. It became a very important area that allows 
parent firms to know the earning situation directly, and it also reflects the operation 
situation.  
 
Then there is clearly difference, since Chinese parent firm mainly focused on production, 
purchasing, HR ,and marketing if the product also sell inside China, and British parent 
firm mainly focused on technical, research, development and strategy.  The main reason 
is Chinese parent firms are very familiar with the local operation, and British parents are 
good at technology and R&D. If the product is mainly exported to UK then the British 
parent firm also focused on marketing area.  
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Control extent 
Both Chinese and British parent firms exercises quite tight control over JV.  Chinese 
firms focused on daily report since they are mainly responsible for the daily operation as 
discussed above the control focus of Chinese firms mainly covers operation areas such as 
production, purchasing, HR and quality.  
 
British firms require monthly report of operation. One British firm manager from case 
company 8 says: 
“We require monthly report in sales, accounting, quality control and we also require 
urgent issue report if something urgent or unusual happens.” 
 
Table 5 Summary of IJV control from case companies. 
Case number Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case5 Case 6 Case7 Case8 
Year of JV 1993 2001 2009 2010 2001 2001 2008 2009 
Equity Share 50% 50% 49% 50% 25% 25% 51% 51% 
control mechanisms 
(form) 
                
Holding Major equity 
share 
* *   *     * * 
Venture board 
representation 
* * * * * * * * 
Appointment of key 
venture person 
* * *       * * 
Exercising vote right * * * * * * * * 
other                 
control mechanisms 
(inform) 
                
Training of venture 
managers 
* * * * * * * * 
Interaction, such as 
meetings 
* * * * * * * * 
Informal socialization 
such as informal phone 
calls, outdoor activities 
* * * * *   * * 
other         *       
Areas of control focus                 
Financing and accounting * * * * * * * * 
Quality control * * * * *   * * 
Production * * * *         
Procurement * * * *         
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Human resources * * * *         
Marketing, sales and 
distribution 
*   *   *     * 
Technology         *     * 
Research and 
Development 
        *   *   
Strategy activities           * *   
Control extent                 
Daily report * * * *         
Monthly report 
* * * * * * * * 
Seasonally  Report * * * * * * * * 
Yearly report * * * * * * * * 
other         *       
                               
 
Trust in IJV 
Empirical findings show that both Chinese and British parent firms trust their partners in 
their JVs. Most of them believe that their partner can fulfill their agreement and has the 
competence to full fill the agreement, even if there is no explicit written agreement 
between them, their partner will behave well toward their mutual benefits. One Chinese 
manager from case company 3 states: 
“Of course we trust our partner; if we do not trust our partner at first place we would 
not form JV with this partner.”  
One British manager from case company 6 says: 
“We believe our Chinese partner since they have the qualification and similar manner of 
doing business as western companies.”  
Another British manager from case company 7 motioned that: 
“I should say at the beginning it was a bit difficult to develop trust, but after many years 
of exchange between the parties, trust was also built through time.  I would say I trust my 
partner.” 
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Contractual trust 
Both Chinese and British parent firms trust their partner will carry out a written promise.  
But both parent firms more willing to make written promise than a verbal promise, it will 
reduce the doubt and enhance the trust between the partners. 
 
But 1 Chinese case company do not trust British partner will carry out a verbal promise 
since they think in western culture every agreement must be written down and must be 
legal.  One Chinese manager from case company 1 refers: 
“In western countries, people pay more attention to the legal issues than Chinese, we 
believe our partner will carry out a written agreement. But if they do not want to make a 
written agreement they knew what it means, then we should not believe that will happen.” 
 
Competence trust 
Result draws that Chinese and British parents both trust their partner have competence to 
fulfill the promises. From British parent point of view, most of them have evaluated 2-3 
candidates before they chose the right one, they already evaluated the ability of the firm 
and its credibility in China.  Chinese parents also did the same when they choose partner, 
so all the qualification, certification and other information will provide the view of 
competence of the partner. As one British manager from case company 7 states: 
“We trust our Chinese partner, since my partner has been in the children clothing 
industry for many years, and they have the local sales channel and marketing expertise, 
we believe in their competence.” 
 
Goodwill trust 
Most of the parent firms trust their partner will behave well towards their mutual benefits 
even if there is no explicit agreement or promises. One Chinese manager from case 
company 4 says: 
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“Both partners invest lots of money, and it is a long term investment. In this case, both 
partners need to trust each other which will reduce uncertainty and risk and enhance 
smooth operation. ” 
One British manger from case company 8 presses the same idea: 
“We need to trust each other even if there is no explicit agreement or promises, since we 
are on the same boat already!” 
 
Relation between control and trust in IJV 
 
Results indicate that 5 of the case companies agree that there is positive relation between 
trust and control. Two British case companies state that there is no direct relation 
between control and trust in IJV.  One from case company 5 says: 
“We think there is no relation between trust and control in our JV, since we really trust 
our partner, it is not because we have control. It is because of the high quality of the 
work they have done. ” 
Another British manager from case company 6 mentioned: 
“We think there is no relation between trust and control in our JV; we think they are 
separate ways to reduce risk in a JV.” 
Differing from above opinions, one Chinese case company manager from case company 
1 says: 
“We increase our control when we cannot trust enough in a certain issue. If we feel there 
is lots of control over the JV from our partner, we will have a sense of distrust from our 
partner.” 
All the statement and findings only can draw the result form Chinese parent point of 
view, that when Chinese parent company has more control over their JV, they trust their 
partner more. There is no agreement between British parent company what is the relation 
between control and trust in IJV. 
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Table 6 Summary of IJV trust from case companies. 
Five-point Likert Scales is used in this study: (1 strongly disagree - 5 Strongly agree) 
Case number Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case5 Case 6 Case7 Case8 
Year of JV 1993 2001 2009 2010 2001 2001 2008 2009 
Equity Share 50% 50% 49% 50% 25% 25% 51% 51% 
Overall trust in Partner                 
Overall, we trust our 
partners.  
4 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 
Contractual trust                 
We trust our partner will 
carry out a verbal or 
written promise.         
3 4 5 4 5 5 4 5 
Competence trust                 
We trust our partner have 
competence to fulfill the 
promises.              
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Goodwill Trust                 
We trust our partner will 
behave well toward 
mutual benefits even 
there is no explicit 
agreement.                          
5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 
Relation between trust               
and control In JV 
                
There is no relation 
between trust and 
control. 
        * *     
There is positive relation 
between trust and 
control. 
  * * *     * * 
There is negative relation 
between trust and 
control. 
*             
 
 
6.3 Empirical findings of IJV performance 
 
Empirical findings show that both Chinese and British parents firms form joint venture to 
earn more profit. Besides this main objective, Chinese parents firms want to learn 
advanced technology from their partners, and two Chinese parents firms also wanted to 
access to British market through their joint venture. Differently than Chinese parents 
firms, the British parents firms did not only want to earn more profit, but they wanted to 
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access low cost sourcing from their joint venture and two British parents firms also 
wanted to access Chinese market. 
 
Findings show that both are satisfied with their IJV performance in terms of financial 
output and overall satisfaction. Regarding the performance related to their own goal 
achievement, British parent firms agreed that the performance achieved their own goals. 
Chinese parent firms agreed that the performance achieved most of their own goal. 
However, two Chinese parent firms aimed to access the British market, but the control of 
the marketing held by their British partner raised barriers thus they could not really 
access the British market.  
 
Table  7  Summary of IJV performance from case companies. 
Five-point Likert Scales is used in this study: ( 1 strongly disagree - 5 Strongly agree) 
Case number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Year of JV 1993 2001 2009 2010 2001 2001 2008 2009 
Equity Share 50% 50% 49% 50% 25% 25% 51% 51% 
Financial output    5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 
Overall satisfaction 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 
Achievement of your 
own goal  (Chinese 
parent firm) 
                
Goal 1: Learning new 
technology 
5 5 5 5 
        
Goal 2: Earning profit       5 5 5           
Goal 3: Access  British 
market            
  3   3 
        
Achievement of your 
own goal  (British parent 
firm)                 
Goal 1: Earning profit              5 4 4 4 
Goal 2: Low cost 
sourcing         
5   5 4 
Goal 3: Access  Chinese 
market                    
    5 4 
Goal 4: Looking for more 
business opportunity           4     
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6.4. Impact of control and trust on IJV performance  
 
6.4.1 Impact of control and trust on IJV performance from British parent 
perspective  
 
Impact of control on IJV performance 
As discussed above, all British parent companies hold both formal and informal control 
over their IJV. It reflects the importance of control in IJV. Findings show that all the 
British managers strongly agree that both formal and informal control mechanisms have 
positive effect on their JV performance in terms of financial output, the overall 
satisfaction and achievement of own goals. The managers give their opinions regarding 
how control mechanisms effect on their JV performance. 
 
British manager from case company 5 mentioned:  
“The main objectives of forming this JV are earning profit and accessing low sourcing 
cost.  Control allows us to apply our sourcing strategy and gain better profit.” 
Manager from case company 6 states that  
“Proper control will keep the high quality of the product. Control over JV on the one 
side results in good financial output, on the other side it reduces potential risk by getting 
correct information through our control mechanisms.” 
Manager from case company 7 says that:  
“We have major share, and we appointed the key person in this JV. Better control over 
your operation results in better financial return and better objective achievement 
directly.” 
Similar opinion is given by the case company 8. 
 “For sure both formal and informal control gives us possibility to know how the 
operation is both financially and operationally. We can achieve our goals though control, 
we hold major equity share, and it makes it easier to direct the operation.” 
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These British managers’ opinions perfectly support our proposition 1: Control 
mechanisms are positively related to (1a) IJV financial output, (1b) overall satisfaction, 
and (1c) goal achievement. 
 
British parent firms exercise their control over the areas that cover financing and 
accounting, quality, technology, research and development, and marketing when the 
product is mainly exported to UK or other country. All the British parent firms agree that 
control focus in specific areas positively affect their JV performance.  
 
British manager from case company 5 describes their situation as:  
“We focus our control on those areas since they are very important for us. Our control 
over quality will give us good sales and profit. That is the most important.”  
Similarly from case company 7, manager says:  
“We control on financing since we want to have better financial output, we control over 
research and development since we do not want to lose our advantage in this JV.” 
Manager from Case company 8 states 
 “In order to gain more profit, we must control cost and increase sales that is why we 
have control over financing and marketing.” 
All of opinions from British parent companies strengthen the proposition 2: Control 
focus is positively related to (2a) IJV financial output, (2b) overall satisfaction, and (2c) 
goal achievement. 
 
In terms of control extent, results show that all of the British parent companies have quite 
tight control over their JV, and they all agree that tight control is positively related to IJV 
performance. All the British parent companies require monthly report from their JV.  
 
British manager from case company 5 says: 
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 “...we require monthly report from our JV in China in order to know what happens, we 
also require urgent report if there is quality problem or other problems like cannot 
deliver the order on time etc.” 
Case company 6 has the same monthly report rules in their JV. Manager states that  
“Our monthly report gives us an entire view of JV operation, for instance the financial 
situation, estimated sales in coming months etc… we make decisions based on it.” 
Manager from case company 7 says that:  
“We require monthly report from our JV, and from the report we get correct data or 
information of our JV operation. At the beginning of our JV we required weekly reports 
from our JV…”  
The above statements from British managers support our proposition 3a and 3b: Control 
extent is positively related to (3a) IJV financial output and (3b) overall satisfaction. But 
the result does not support our proposition (3c) control extent is not related to goal 
achievement. In fact control extent has positive effect on JV performance. 
 
Impact of trust on IJV performance 
Empirical findings show that British parent firms trust their partners in their JVs. All of 
them believe that their partner can fulfil their agreement and has the competence to fulfil 
the agreement, even if there is no explicit written agreement between them their partner 
will behave well toward their mutual benefits. 
 
British manager from case company 5 says that: 
” We trust that our partner will carry out a verbal or written promise since they have 
very good reputation in China. Our trust does not directly return in our financial output 
but indirectly it does…” 
Another British manager from case company 6 says that:  
“We know the owners not from the business but we also knew them personally very well, 
so we believe they will carry out a verbal or written promise, especially in China very 
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often verbal promise count in business….Our trust somewhat has positive effect on our 
performance.” 
However, manager from case company 7 has different opinion as others. He thinks there 
is no relation between trust and their JV performance. 
 “I do trust our partner will carry out their promise, but I do not think there is any 
relation between this trust and JV performance. For instance the sales will not increase 
because I trust they will carry out their promise.” 
Although there is one manager who has different opinion than other British manager, 
overall we can see that contractual trust has positive effect on JV performance. Therefore, 
proposition 4 is supported. Contractual-based trust is positively related to (4a) IJV 
financial output and (4b) overall satisfaction, and (4c) goal achievement. 
 
British managers from all the case company trust that their partners have competence to 
fulfill their promises or agreements.  Three of British case companies agree there is 
positive relation between competence trust and their JV performance. One of the 
managers from case company 8 says:  
“We do trust our partner very much, that is how we selected them as our partner, and 
their qualifications let us believe they have competence to fulfill the agreements. In fact 
we did see the good result in our financial output and we also achieved our goals…” 
Differing from other opinion, manager from case company 7 says:  
“We trust our Chinese partner, since my partner has been in children clothing industry 
for many years, and they have the local sales channel and marketing expertise, we 
believe in their competence. But we did not see that there is relation between this trust 
and our JV performance.” 
However, most of our British case companies agree that competence trust has positive 
effect on JV performance. Therefore the proposition 5 is supported. Competence-based 
trust is positively related to (5a) IJV financial output and (5b) overall satisfaction, and (5c) 
goal achievement. 
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Findings show that all the British managers trust that their partner will behave well 
towards mutual benefits even if there is no explicit agreement. Three of the British case 
companies agree that there is positive relation between this goodwill trust and their JV 
performance. One of the managers from case company 8 says:  
“We need to trust each other even if there is no explicit agreement or promises, since we 
are on the same boat already. We do trust that our partner will behave well towards 
mutual benefit even if there is no agreement. There might be no direct effect on our JV 
performance but we believe there is positive relation between our trust and our JV 
performance.” 
Differently from other opinions, manager from case company 7 says:  
“We do trust that our partner will consider our mutual benefit in case if a difficult 
situation comes. But we do not think there is any relation between this trust and our JV 
performance.” 
The proposition 6 is supported by the opinions from British parent companies, that 
goodwill trust is positively related to (6a) IJV financial output and (6b) overall 
satisfaction, and (6c) goal achievement since most of case company  
 
Table 8 Summary of impact of control and trust on IJV performance From British parent 
perspective.  
Five-point Likert Scale is used in this study:  (1Not at all - 5Highly affected) 
Case  Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 Case 8 
Establish of JV 2001 2001 2008 2009 
Equity Share 25% 25% 51% 51% 
Control 
mechanisms:     Did 
those control 
mechanisms affect 
the performance of 
JV 
A). Financial output    
5 5 5 5 
B). Overall satisfaction 5 5 5 5 
C). Achievement of your own goal   5 5 5 5 
Control focus :      
Did those control  
focus affect the 
performance of JV 
A). Financial output    5 4 4 5 
B). Overall satisfaction 5 4 4 5 
C). Achievement of your own goal   
5 4 4 4 
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Control Extent :      
Did those control  
extent affect the 
performance of JV 
A). Financial output    4 4 4 5 
B). Overall satisfaction 4 4 4 5 
C). Achievement of your own goal   
4 4 4 5 
 Contractual trust:                
Do you feel your 
trust in your partner 
have any effect on 
the performance of 
JV  
A). Financial output    
4 4 3 4 
B). Overall satisfaction 
4 4 3 4 
C). Achievement of your own goal   4 4 3 4 
Competence trust:                
Do you feel your 
trust in your partner 
have any effect on 
the performance of 
JV  
A). Financial output    
5 4 3 4 
B). Overall satisfaction 
5 4 3 4 
C). Achievement of your own goal   5 4 3 4 
Goodwill trust:            
Do you feel your 
trust in your partner 
have any effect on 
the performance of 
JV  
A). Financial output    
5 4 3 4 
B). Overall satisfaction 5 4 3 4 
C). Achievement of your own goal   
5 4 3 4 
 
6.4.2 Impact of control and trust on IJV performance from Chinese parent 
perspective 
 
Impact of control on IJV performance 
Same as in case of British parent companies, Chinese parent companies also hold both 
formal and informal control over their IJVs. Result shows that all the Chinese managers 
strongly agree that both formal and informal control mechanisms have positive effect on 
their JV performance. Chinese manager from case company 1 says:  
“Only control can ensure the smooth operation and development of our business, either 
formal or informal control has positive effect on our goal achievement……” 
Manager from case company 2 states that: 
“Control is basic for every business, it becomes more important when it is JV. It directly 
affect on the financial output and goal achievement.” 
Manager from case company 4 says that:  
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“Control is a good way to achieve satisfaction of business operation, objective or goal 
only can be achieved through control.” 
Chinese managers’ opinions strongly support our proposition 1: Control mechanisms are 
positively related to (1a) IJV financial output, (1b) overall satisfaction, and (1c) goal 
achievement. 
 
Differently than British parent firms, Chinese parent companies exercise their control 
over the areas covering financing and accounting, quality, production, procurement, HR, 
and marketing if the products sell inside the country. Chinese manager from case 
company 3 states:  
“We know the local management culture, we know the supplier, we know the sales 
channel. And about those areas our partner might not know anything, so we need to 
control those areas in order to ensure our profitability and goal achievement. ”  
Similarly to case company 4, manager says:  
“We are familiar with local operations, so it is our responsibility to control the areas 
such as production, procurement and HR to ensure satisfactory JV performance.” 
All the Chinese parent managers agree that control focus in specific area positively effect 
on their JV performance. It supports proposition 2: Control focus is positively related to 
(2a) IJV financial output, (2b) overall satisfaction, and (2c) goal achievement. 
 
In terms of control extent, the result differs from British parent companies. All Chinese 
parent firms require daily report that shows their control over their JV is extremely high. 
One reason is that the JV is in China, the daily operation needs to be controlled by the 
Chinese parent company.  Chinese managers agree that tight control positively related to 
IJV performance.  
Chinese manager from case company 1 says: 
 “Daily reports allow us to control our operations, how much product needs to be 
produced, how many materials need to be purchased… all those reports with accuracy 
data will help us to have better operation that results in better financial output and 
satisfactory performance.” 
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Case company 3 also requires daily report. Manager states that  
“Our monthly report gives us an entire view of JV operations, for instance the financial 
situation, estimated sales in coming months etc… we make decisions based on it.” 
Manager from case company 4 says that:  
“Daily reports allow us to find out any unusual clue which may result in a very serious 
problem and maintain satisfactory performance.”  
 
The above statements from Chinese managers support our proposition 3a and 3b: Control 
extent is positively related to (3a) IJV financial output and (3b) overall satisfaction. 
However, the result does not support the proposition 3c. Our finding shows that control 
extent is positively related to goal achievement. 
 
Impact of trust on IJV performance 
Empirical findings show that Chinese parent firms trust their partners in their JVs.  
Chinese manager from case company 2 says that: 
“We believe that our partner will carry out their promise since we have the same 
investment, and it is a big investment. Based on our experience they always fulfil what is 
written in the contract and even verbal promise….Because of this trust developed 
between us, we make more profit than before, since our partner transfers more project to 
this JV.” 
Chinese manger from case company 3 states: 
” We trust that our partner will carry out their promise since they have good reputation 
in UK in the industry…..we believe that this trust indirectly effect our JV performance in 
positive way.” 
However, Chinese manager from case company 1 has different opinion from other case 
companies:  
“In western countries, people pay more attention to the legal issues than Chinese, we 
believe that our partner will carry out a written agreement. But if they do not want to 
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make a written agreement they knew what it means, then we should not believe that will 
happen….” 
Although manager from case company 1 has different opinion as others. Overall, most 
managers agree that contractual trust has positive effect on JV performance. Therefore, 
proposition 4 is supported. Contractual-based trust is positively related to (4a) IJV 
financial output and (4b) overall satisfaction, and (4c) goal achievement. 
 
In terms of competence trust, Chinese managers trust their partners have the competence 
to fulfill their promises or agreement.  All of Chinese managers agree that there is 
positive relation between competence trust and their JV performance. One of the 
managers from case company 2 says:  
“We trust our partner has the competence to fulfill our agreements. They have the most 
advanced technology and popular brand in Europe…our trust in their competence have 
positive effect on our JV performance” 
Chinese manager from case company 4 has similar opinion:  
“Our partner has operations in different areas; our partner does not only have capital, 
but also have high technology. To learn high technology was one of our goals when we 
formed this JV, we believe we will achieve our goal based on our trust.” 
All Chinese companies agree that competence trust has positive effect on JV 
performance. Therefore the proposition 5 is supported. Competence-based trust is 
positively related to (5a) IJV financial output and (5b) overall satisfaction, and (5c) goal 
achievement. 
 
The result indicates that all Chinese managers trust that their partner will behave well 
towards mutual benefits even if there is no explicit agreement. They also agree that there 
is positive relation between this goodwill trust and their JV performance. One of the 
managers from case company 1 says:  
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“Trust is the most important thing between business partners, and it becomes more 
important when there is no explicit agreement. We invest in earning more profit, there is 
no reason we do not behave well towards our mutual benefits. We do believe our partner 
thinks the same.” 
Chinese manager from case company 4 states: 
“Both partners invest lots of money, and it is a long term investment. In this case, both 
partners need to trust each other which will reduce uncertainty and risk and enhance 
smooth operation. ” 
The proposition 6 is supported by all the Chinese managers. Goodwill trust is positively 
related to (6a) IJV financial output and (6b) overall satisfaction, and (6c) goal 
achievement since most of case company  
 
Table 9 Summary of impact of control and trust on IJV performance from Chinese 
parent perspective. 
Five-point Likert Scales is used in this study:  (1 not at all – 5 highly affected) 
Case  Case 1 Case2 Case3 Case4 
Establish of JV 1993 2001 2009 2010 
Equity Share 50% 50% 49% 50% 
Control mechanisms:     
Did those control 
mechanisms affect the 
performance of JV 
A). Financial output    4 4 4 4 
B). Overall satisfaction 5 5 5 4 
C). Achievement of your 
own goal   
5 5 5 4 
Control focus :             
Did those control  focus 
affect the performance of 
JV 
A). Financial output    5 5 5 4 
B). Overall satisfaction 4 5 4 5 
C). Achievement of your 
own goal   
5 5 5 4 
Control Extent :          
Did those control  extent 
affect the performance of 
JV 
A). Financial output    5 5 5 5 
B). Overall satisfaction 5 5 5 5 
C). Achievement of your 
own goal   
5 5 5 5 
 Contractual trust:            
Do you feel your trust in 
your partner have any 
A). Financial output    3 4 5 4 
B). Overall satisfaction 3 4 5 5 
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effect on the performance 
of JV  
C). Achievement of your 
own goal   
3 4 4 5 
Competence trust:            
Do you feel your trust in 
your partner have any 
effect on the performance 
of JV  
A). Financial output    4 4 4 4 
B). Overall satisfaction 
4 5 4 4 
C). Achievement of your 
own goal   
4 5 4 4 
Goodwill trust:            
Do you feel your trust in 
your partner have any 
effect on the performance 
of JV  
A). Financial output    
5 3 5 5 
B). Overall satisfaction 
5 5 5 5 
C). Achievement of your 
own goal   
5 5 5 5 
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION    
 
This chapter opens up the theoretical side of the study with summaries. Next it concludes 
the findings of the empirical study, and draws the empirical frame work of this study. 
Finally, managerial implications and implication for the theory and further research are 
suggested. 
 
7.1. Summary  
    
The objective of the present study was “What is the relation between control, trust and 
performance in International Joint Ventures in China?” This study focused on Sino-
British manufacturing joint ventures in China. To answer this research question, the sub-
objectives of the study were: 
1. To increase the understanding about the nature of control in IJVs. 
2. To analyse the key concept “trust”.  
3. To conceptualize the key concept of “performance”. 
4. To theoretically analyse the link between “control” and “performance”, and the link 
between “trust” and “performance” in IJVs.  
5. To empirically analyse the relation between “control” and “performance”, and the 
relation between “trust” and “performance” in Sino-British IJVs. 
 
Chapter 2 concentrated on the first sub-objective of the study. To answer this sub-
objective, the conceptualization of IJV control, foundation theories of IJV control were 
discussed in detail. 
 
International joint venture control has been studied by many researchers due to the 
importance of control in IJVs. The notion of control in IJVs is much more complex and 
multifaceted concept, since two or more parties join in the management control of IJVs. 
82 
Present study adopts the notion of control defined by Geringer and Hebert (1989: 236-
237), which is defined as:  
 “the process by which one partner influences, to varying degrees, the behaviour and 
output of the other partner, through the use of power, authority and a wide range of 
bureaucratic, cultural and informal mechanisms.”  
In order to get better understanding of how control affects the performance of IJVs, three 
dimensions of control in IJVs were examined in this study, they are control mechanisms, 
control focus and control extent. 
 
Resource dependence theory and transaction cost economics have become the most 
frequently used theories to explain the IJV control. Both theories explains one of most 
important reason of formation IJV, and it also gives answer to why control is needed in 
IJVs. 
 
Chapter 3 concentrated on the second sub-objective of this study. To answer this sub-
objective, the concept of trust in IJVs, different dimensions of trust, foundation theories 
of IJV trust were discussed. 
Scholars agreed the importance of trust in IJV, but there is not universal definition of IJV 
trust. This study prefers more comprehensive definition of IJV trust by Boersma, 
Buckley and Ghauri (2003: 1032), trust is: 
“an expectation that a party can be relied on to keep to agreements (promissory), will 
perform its role competently (competence) and that the party will behave honourably 
even where no exploit promises or performance guarantees have been made (good will).” 
Three dimension of trust defined by Sako (1992) were chosen for examing the IJV 
performance in this study, they are contractual-based trust, competence-based trust and 
goodwill-based trust. 
Social exchange theory and transaction cost economics have become the most frequently 
used theory to explain the IJV trust. . Both theories explains one of most important 
reason of formation IJV, and it also gives answer to why trust is needed in IJVs. 
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Chapter 4 concentrated on the third and fourth sub-objective of this study. First the 
complexity of IJV performance and performance measurements in IJVs are discussed. 
Then, the impact of control and trust on IJV performance has been separately discussed 
and the proposed conceptual framework is presented. 
This is no appropriate definition of IJV performance and its measurement. The reasons 
are IJV performance is a multivariate construct that cannot be represented by one single 
indicator, and it is impossible to have a universal definition. Furthermore, each party in 
the IJV may also have their own criteria for performance evaluation, since they have 
different motivation to form the IJV. Even, the measurement of performance in a single 
organization is a controversial area, since there is no clarification between indicators of 
performance and determinates of performance. This difficulty of measuring performance 
is exacerbated in IJVs because of number of parties involved in IJV. However, Objective 
measure of financial output and subjective measure of overall satisfaction with IJV 
performance, and goal achievement will be taken into consideration for examining the 
IJV performance in present study. 
The impact of control and trust on IJV performance is discussed based on prior studies. 
According to previous studies, both control and trust are positively related to IJV 
performance except control extent do not have relation with goal achievement, 6 
propositions were proposed from this study.   
 
Chapter 5 explained the methodology used in the present study. Qualitative case study 
was chosen as the method for empirical study since it is suitable for this research 
objective. It gave opportunities to gain deeper understanding of the impact of control and 
trust in IJV performance. Data collection was done by telephone interviews with the semi 
structured questionnaires. 
 
Chapter 6 concentrated on the fifth sub-objective of this study which is to empirically 
analyse the link between “control” and “performance” in IJV and the link between “trust” 
and “performance” in IJV. 
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The empirical finding shows that both Chinese and British parent firms exercise control 
over their IJVs. The both parent firms adopted both formal and informal control 
mechanisms in their IJVs, they both require very tight control over their IJVs, but they 
do focus their control in different areas.  In terms of trust, both parent firms trust their 
partners and they all believe their partner have competence to fulfil the promises and will 
behave well toward mutual benefits even there is no explicit agreement. Furthermore, 
most of the firms believe their partner will carry out a verbal or written promise, but one 
Chinese firm does not believe that its partner will carry out a verbal promise. 
In terms of relation between control and trust in IJVs, Chinese parent companies believe 
that there is positive relation between IJV control and trust. Two British parent firms 
could have the same conclusion, but another two British parent firms believe there is no 
relation between control and trust in IJV.  
 
7.2. Conclusions 
 
Previous studies indicate that control and trust are the two most important antecedent of 
IJV performance. In spite of this, the emerging literature has paid insufficient attention to 
examine them jointly and with both parent perspective. This study has focused on the 
impact of control and trust on IJV performance from both parent perspective and four 
key findings of this study are found as below. 
 
First, following the advice of Geringer and Hebert (1989), in order to get better 
understand of how control affects the performance of IJVs, this study has examined three 
dimensions (control mechanisms, control focus and control extent) of control jointly with 
their relation to three performance measurements (financial output, overall satisfaction 
and goal achievement) of IJV. Both Chinese and British parent companies were studied, 
and the findings of this study confirm the proposition 1, proposition 2 and proposition 3a 
and 3b. This means both Chinese and British parent companies agree that control 
mechanisms and control focus has positive relation with IJV financial output, overall 
satisfaction and goal achievement. The control extent is positively related to IJV 
financial output and overall satisfaction.  But the findings also show that control extent 
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has positive relation with IJV goal achievement which is differ from the proposition  
3c.there is no relation between them. A good point from Chinese case company is: “Our 
goal is to earn profit from this JV, and we are responsible for daily operation, we must 
have daily report to ensure that we are in the right position. Definitely the tightness of 
control affects our goal achievement. ” British manager presses the similar idea: “We 
require monthly report since we want to know that everything is right there, if we require 
seasonal report it will be too late to notice the potential problems and make adjustment.” 
 
Second, to analyze the nature of trust with its relation to IJV performance, this study 
breaks down the trust into three dimensions: contractual trust, competence trust and 
goodwill trust in order to gather better understanding of their relation with IJV 
performance. Empirical findings indicate that both Chinese and British parent company 
agree that trust has positive relation with IJV performance, therefore the proposition 
4,5,6 are supported by the findings. The result confirms the importance and the need of 
trust in IJV performance. 
 
Third, the relation between control and trust in IJV has been studies in this study. Five of 
the case companies agree that there is positive relation between control and trust.  
Although two British parent companies agree that there is positive relation between 
control and trust, but another two British parent companies argue there is no directly 
relation between control and trust. Therefore this study cannot draw the finding from 
British parent point of view regarding the relation between control and trust in IJVs. 
Three Chinese parent companies agree that there is positive relation between control and 
trust. This information indicates that when Chinese parent company has more control 
over their JV, they become more trust their partners.  
 
Fourth, although it has been discussed that both control and trust has positive effect on 
IJV performance but according to the findings 100% of the answers agree that control 
has positive effect on IJV performance, 64 % of the answer confirm control has highly 
effect on their IJV performance. In terms of trust, 81% of the answers agree that trust has 
positive effect on IJV performance, and only 35% of the answer from both Chinese and 
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British parent firm confirm that control has highly effect on their IJV performance. 
During the interview, many managers confirm that control has direct effect on IJV 
performance and trust has indirect effect on IJV performance. For instance, one British 
manager mentioned: “We need to trust each other even if there is no explicit agreement 
or promises, since we are on the same boat already! We do trust our partner will behave 
well towards our mutual benefit even if there is no agreement. There might be no direct 
effect on our JV performance but we believe there is positive relation between our trust 
and our JV performance.”  Another manager also says: “We trust that our partner will 
carry out a verbal or written promise since they have very good reputation in China. Our 
trust not directly returns in our financial output but indirectly does...” 
 
Figure 5 shows the empirical findings of this study. It shows the impact of control and 
trust on IJV from both Chinese and British parent perspective.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please note: DR means that there is direct effect and IDR means that there is indirect effect. 
 Figure 5 Empirical findings. 
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7.3. Managerial implications     
 
This study exams control and trust jointly in relation to IJV performance. The findings 
suggest that managers need to recognize that control is important for IJV performance. 
Control on one hand can hold critical resource the parent provide in IJVs and maintain its 
control position. On the other hand control can reduce cost and to gain better IJV 
performance. Control mechanisms, control focus, and control extent are positively 
related to IJV performance. Managers need to use them joint in their IJV control in order 
to achieve better IJV performance. 
 
Another finding suggests that managers need to notice the importance of trust in IJVs. 
Trust is also positively related to IJV performance. In one side trust in IJV can reduce 
both ex anta and ex post transaction cost, and it also can protect from opportunism. In 
another side, trust provides the social “glue” within which economic exchange occurs, 
and produce of on-going interactions between the partners. Therefore, managers need to 
develop mutual trust between partners in order to achieve better IJV performance.  
 
Empirical findings indicate that control has direct effect on IJV performance and trust 
has indirect effect on IJV performance.  This result suggests managers that control and 
trust are two separate routes to risk reduction, firms need to combine and balance them in 
specific ways to achieve best risk management and performance improvement. 
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 7.4. Implications for theory and future research  
 
This study has given results on the impact of control and trust on IJV performance. The 
major contribution of this study is to study both control and trust jointly to the relation of 
IJV performance. This helps the managers to understand the importance of control and 
trust for IJV performance simultaneously, rather focusing only one antecedent.  
 
This study also adds both partners’ perspective of IJV performance. Taking only one 
partner’s perspective on IJV performance is incomplete since every partner has its own 
objective of forming IJV. In addition, the present study used both objective and 
subjective measures for IJV performance. The reason for that is good objective 
achievement may not really lead to satisfaction of the partner if they have other 
expectations from their IJV. 
 
This study has given deep insights to practitioners to understand the impact of control 
and trust on IJV performance and how to manage them jointly to achieve better IJV 
performance. However, this study was done by using few case companies as the method 
to answer the research questions. It will be more interesting if the further research can 
adopt a large quantitative study on this research topic. Moreover, the present study did 
not draw conclusion regarding the relation between control and trust from the British 
parent company perspective in their Sino-British JV in China. It can be one interesting 
future research area. Furthermore, this study was conducted between a developed 
country and a developing country and it would be interesting to conduct a comparative 
study to know the impact of control and trust on IJVs between developed countries. 
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APPENDIX 1: Semi-structured interview questionnaire 
 
                               Semi-structured interview questionnaire 
Name of your company:                                                                                                .  
Name of IJV and location:                                                                                                   . 
The year of IJV was 
formed:                                                                                                    . 
Name of partner companies and their ownership shares: 
Partner 1:                                        %         .     Partner 2:                                   %            . 
Partner 3:                                        %               Partner 4:                                   %           . 
Type of this joint venture: A).          Greenfield; B).            . Partial acquisition 
 
 1. What were the main reasons for your company to choose JV than another 
mode?                        .   
A).Earn profit; B).Increase market share; C).Low cost sourcing; D). Access to local 
marketing expertise; E).Establish a base to access other countries; F).Access to local 
management expertise;   G). Develop or learning new product/technology; H).Achieve 
economies of scale;  
I).Access to local distribution channel; J).Reduce capital investment; 
Others (Please specify if the reason is not in the list):                                                         . 
 
2. What were the goals of your company expected to achieve in this  
JV?                                                                                                                                     . 
 
3. For how long time the IJV was planned to last? Was there any clear reference in 
the IJV agreement? 
A).      No reference in the agreement;  B).     1-2 years; C).      3-4 years;       
D).      5-6years;    E).     7-9years;  F).     10 years or longer time;                                                                                                                                                        
4. What is your ownership share in this JV?  What was the original share your 
company expected? If it was different, why?                                                           .  
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5. Your company’s operation in the country before the establishment of this JV: 
A).               no prior activity;  B).            licensing agreement;    C.) ____ exporting;  
D). ____ a wholly-owned manufacturing unit;  E). ____ a manufacturing joint venture;   
F). ____ several manufacturing units ;              G). ____other operations. 
 
6.  What was your company’s experience in IJV operation at the time of JV’s 
establishment? 
A).          .Non;  B).           .One; C).             2-4;  D).           .5-9; F).                 10 or more.. 
 
7.  Did you have JV experience in the target country before?        Yes.            No 
 
8. How many potential partner candidates did your firm evaluate before it chose 
this partner? 
A).____ 1 (the final partner);  B). ____2 ; C). ____3-5;  D). ____6-9; E). _____10 or 
more. 
 
9.  Who would you say has control over the JV? How many percent of control does 
your company have over the JV?                                                                        . . 
 
10. What kind of control mechanisms did your company have over the JV?  
Formal control:     A).        Holding Major equity share;  B).     Venture board 
representation;    
C).        Appointment of key venture person; D).     Exercising vote 
right; 
Informal control:   E).     Training of venture managers;   F).     Interaction, such as 
meetings.  G).         Informal socialization such as informal phone calls, outdoor activities. 
Others (Please specify if not in the list)                                                                        . 
 
11. Did those control mechanisms affect the performance of JV in terms of financial 
output, the overall satisfaction and achievement of own goal? Please choose as 
below: 
 
99 
                                                           Not at all         somewhat      highly affected 
A). Financial output                                  1                  2      3      4               5 
B). Overall satisfaction                             1                  2      3      4               5 
C). Achievement of your own goal           1                 2       3      4               5 
 
12. To which areas do you focus on your control over the JV?  Why do you choose 
those areas? 
A).      Financing and accounting;   B).      Quality control;    C).      Production;  D).       
Procurement; 
E).      Human resources; F).      Marketing, sales and distribution;  G).        Technology. 
H).      Research and Development; I).       Strategy activities;  
Others (Please specify if not in the 
list)                                                                                          . 
 
13.  Did you feel control over those areas affect the performance of JV in terms of 
financial output, the overall satisfaction and achievement of own goal? Please 
choose as below: 
                                                            Not at all         somewhat      highly affected 
A). Financial output                                  1                  2      3      4               5 
B). Overall satisfaction                             1                  2      3      4               5 
C). Achievement of your own goal           1                 2       3      4               5 
 
14.  How tightness of control your company had in your JV?  
A).       Daily report;   B).      Monthly report;  C).        Seasonally  Report;  D).      Yearly 
report. O thers (Please specify if not in the list)                                                                  . 
 
15.  Did you feel the tightness of control affect the performance of JV in terms of 
financial output, the overall satisfaction and achievement of own goal?   Please 
choose as below: 
                                                        Not at all         somewhat      highly affected 
A). Financial output                                  1                  2      3      4               5 
B). Overall satisfaction                             1                  2      3      4               5 
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C). Achievement of your own goal           1                 2       3      4               5 
 
16. Overall, in which degree do you trust your partner?  
                                                       Strongly disagree                              strongly agree 
We trust our partners.                                       1                      2      3      4                5 
 
17. Do you believe your partner will carry out a verbal or written promise? 
                                                       Strongly disagree                              strongly agree 
We trust our partner will carry out                  1                      2      3      4                5 
a verbal or written promise. 
 
18.  Do you feel your trust in your partner have any effect on the performance of JV 
in terms of financial output, overall satisfaction and goal achievement? Please 
choose as below: 
                                                         Not at all         somewhat      highly affected 
A). Financial output                                  1                  2      3      4               5 
B). Overall satisfaction                             1                  2      3      4               5 
C). Achievement of your own goal           1                 2       3      4               5 
 
19. Do you believe your partner have competence to fulfil the promises? 
                                                      Strongly disagree                              strongly agree 
We trust our partner have competence           1                      2      3      4                5 
       to fulfill the promises. 
 
20. Do you feel your trust in your partner have any effect on the performance of JV 
in terms of financial output, overall satisfaction and goal achievement? Please 
choose as below: 
                                                            Not at all         somewhat      highly affected 
A). Financial output                                  1                  2      3      4               5 
B). Overall satisfaction                             1                  2      3      4               5 
C). Achievement of your own goal           1                 2       3      4               5 
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21. Do you trust your partner will behave well toward your mutual benefits even 
there is no explicit agreement or promises? 
                                                       Strongly disagree                              strongly agree 
We trust our partner will behave well 
Toward mutual benefits even there is            1                     2       3       4                5 
 No explicit agreement. 
 
22. Do you feel your trust in your partner have any effect on the performance of JV 
in terms of financial output, overall satisfaction and goal achievement? Please 
choose as below: 
                                                         Not at all         somewhat      highly affected 
A). Financial output                                  1                  2      3      4               5 
B). Overall satisfaction                             1                  2      3      4               5 
C). Achievement of your own goal           1                 2       3      4               5 
 
 
23. How do you define the relation between trust and control in this JV? 
A). There is no relation between trust and control. 
B). There is positive relation between trust and control. 
C). There is negative relation between trust and control. 
Other, please 
specify                                                                                                                  . 
 
24. Are you satisfied with the performance of this JV? 
Strongly unsatisfied                    strongly satisfied   
Financial Performance                                            1              2      3      4                 5 
Overall satisfaction of the JV Performance            1               2      3      4               5 
Achievement of your goals: 
Goal 1: (From the 2
nd
 question                               1              2      3     4                 5  
Goal 2: (From the 2
nd
 question                               1              2      3     4                 5  
Goal 3: (From the 2
nd
 question                               1              2      3     4                 5  
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25.  If you are not satisfied with this JV performance, in which part you are not 
satisfied? Please specify the reasons?  
                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                      . 
 
26. Can you think of anything that you or your partner could have done differently 
that would have improved the performance of this JV?  
                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                  . 
 
 Your name: ________________________                               ___     
 Your position in the company: ______________       ___________ 
Your telephone contact number: _________     ___                   ____                                   
Your email:  ____________________________________________ 
Did you participate in the establishment of the JV? ____Yes        ____No 
Your relationship with the JV at the moment: 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Would you like to have a summary of the study results? ____Yes        ____No 
 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation! 
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采访问卷表 
 
公司名称:                                                                                                      .  
合资公司名称和地址:                                                                                      . 
合资公司建立年份:                                                                               . 
合作伙伴以及他们持股比例: 
合作伙伴 1:                                        .     合作伙伴2:                                               . 
合作伙伴3:                                          .    合作伙伴4:                                              . 
合资公司类型: A).          重新建立公司; B).            . 部分收购 
 
 1. 哪些是贵公司选择合资模式的原因?                        .   
A).赚取更多利润; B).增加市场份额; C).低成本采购; D). 获取当地市场的相关专业
知识; E).建立一个通往其他国家的基础; F). 获取当地管理方面的相关专业知识  G). 
开发或者是学习新的产品/技术; H).获取规模经济利益;I). 获取当地配送通道; J).减
少资本投资;  
其他 (如果贵公司选择合资模式的原因未在列表中，请阐述):                                . 
 
2. 在本次合资中，什么是贵公司最想要达到的目标? 
                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                     . 
 
3. 这个合资项目贵公司预期会持续多久？在合同中有明确写出来吗？ 
A).      在合同中未标准具体的合作期限;  B).     1-2 年; C).      3-4 年;       
D).      5-6年;    E).     7-9年;  F).     10 年或更长.                                                                                                                                                        
 
4. 贵公司在此次合资公司中所占的股份比例是多少? 这个股份配额是不是原来贵
公司预期的? 如果不是，为什么? 
                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                        . 
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5.  贵公司在合资公司成立之前在中国的运作情况: 
A).               没有任何商业活动;  B).            授权协议;    C.) ____ 出口;  
D). ____ 独自拥有的制造厂商;  E). ____ 合资制造厂商;  F). ____ 多个制造工厂 ; 
G). ____其他运作方式  
 
6.  贵公司在此次合资公司之前是否有相关合资经验？ 
A).          .没有;  B).           .有过一次; C).             2-4次;   
D).          .5-9次; F).               10 次及以上. 
 
7.  贵公司是否有在中国的合资经验？        有.            没有 
 
8. 在选择这个合作伙伴时，公司有评估过多少个可潜在的合作伙伴？ 
A).____ 1 (最终的合作伙伴); B). ____2个 ; C). ____3-5个;  
 D). ____6-9个; E). _____10 个及以上. 
 
9. 在合资公司中谁享有控制权？贵公司对合资公司中的控制占多少比例？  
                                                                                                                                    . 
 
10. 在此合资公司中，贵公司运用了哪些控制机制？  
正式的控制机制: A).        掌控主要的股份;  B).          控制出席合资公司董事会人员;    
C).         委任合资公司的关键人员; D).          行使投票权; 
非正式控制机制: E).         培训合资公司经理;   F).          加强互动，如会议等.              
G).         非正式的社交活动，如电话，网络交流或户外活动等. 
其他  (若未在清单中，请阐述)                                                                                          . 
11. 前面提到的控制机制对合资公司在以下三方面是否有影响 ：财政收入，整体
的运作满意程度，对达到自己的目标? 请对相应影响程序做以下选择： 
                                                         无影响         有一些影响     有非常大的影响 
A). 财政收入                                             1                  2      3      4               5 
B). 整体运作满意程序                             1                  2      3      4               5 
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C). 自己公司合资目标的达成                 1                 2       3      4               5 
 
12. 贵公司具体在哪些运作领域上对合资公司实施控制？ 为什么选择这些领域？ 
A).      财政方面;   B).      质量控制;    C).      生产;  D).       采购; E).      人力资源; F).      
市场，销售和渠道;  G).        技术. H).      研发; I).       策略相关;  
其他 (若未在清单中，请阐述)                                                                                          . 
 
13. 前面提到的相关控制领域对合资公司在以下三方面是否有影响 ：财政收入，
整体的运作满意程度，对达到自己的目标? 请对相应影响程序做以下选择： 
                                                         无影响         有一些影响     有非常大的影响 
A). 财政收入                                             1                  2      3      4               5 
B). 整体运作满意程序                             1                  2      3      4               5 
C). 自己公司合资目标的达成                 1                 2       3      4               5 
 
14.  贵公司对此合资公司的控制程度?  
A).       每天的运作情况报告;   B).      每月的运作情况报告;   
C).        每季度的运作情况报告;  D).       年度的运作情况报告. 
其他 (若未在清单中，请阐述)                                                                                          . 
 
15.  前面提到的相关控制程序对合资公司在以下三方面是否有影响 ：财政收入，
整体的运作满意程度，对达到自己的目标? 请对相应影响程序做以下选择： 
                                                         无影响         有一些影响     有非常大的影响 
A). 财政收入                                             1                  2      3      4               5 
B). 整体运作满意程序                             1                  2      3      4               5 
C). 自己公司合资目标的达成                 1                 2       3      4               5 
 
17. 总的来说，你是否信任你的合作伙伴? 请选择任何程度如下： 
                                                             完全不信任                                      非常信任 
我们非常信任我们的合作伙伴                     1                   2      3      4                5 
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18. 你是否相信你的合作伙伴将履行口头的承诺？ 
                                                        完全不相信                                            完全相信 
我们相信我们的合作伙伴会                        1                      2      3      4                5 
履行口头的承诺. 
 
18.  你是否认 为对合作伙伴的信任对合资公司在以下三方面有影响 ：财政收入，
整体的运作满意程度，对达到自己的目标? 请对相应影响程序做以下选择： 
                                                         无影响         有一些影响     有非常大的影响 
A). 财政收入                                             1                  2      3      4               5 
B). 整体运作满意程序                             1                  2      3      4               5 
C). 自己公司合资目标的达成                 1                 2       3      4               5 
 
19. 你是否相信你的合作伙伴有履行承诺的能力？ 
                                                        完全不相信                                            完全相信 
我们相信我们的合作伙伴有                        1                      2      3      4                5 
       履行承诺的能力. 
 
20. 你是否认 为对合作伙伴的履行承诺能力的信任对合资公司在以下三方面有影
响 ：财政收入，整体的运作满意程度，对达到自己的目标? 请对相应影响程序做
以下选择：                                                 无影响         有一些影响     有非常大的影响 
A). 财政收入                                             1                  2      3      4               5 
B). 整体运作满意程序                             1                  2      3      4               5 
C). 自己公司合资目标的达成                 1                 2       3      4               5 
 
 
 
21. 你是否相信你的合作伙伴在没有具体的协议或是承诺的前提下也会以双方互利
作为运作的方向？ 
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                                                             完全不相信                                            完全相信 
我们相信我们的合作伙伴在即时 
没有协议或是承诺的前提下也会                      1                     2       3       4                5 
以双方互利作为运作的方向。. 
 
 22. 你是否认 为对合作伙伴的这种互利为目标的信任对合资公司在以下三方面有
影响 ：财政收入，整体的运作满意程度，对达到自己的目标? 请对相应影响程序
做以下选择： 
                                                        无影响         有一些影响     有非常大的影响 
A). 财政收入                                             1                  2      3      4               5 
B). 整体运作满意程序                             1                  2      3      4               5 
C). 自己公司合资目标的达成                 1                 2       3      4               5 
 
23.  你认为的此合资公司中对合作伙伴的控制与信任之间的关系是什么？ 
A.在此合资中，控制与信任之间没有任何关系 
B. 控制与信任之前有正面积极的影响关系，控制让我们更信任对方。 
C.控制与信任之间有负责的影响关系，合作伙伴的控制让对我们不信任合作伙伴。 
其他？                                                                                                                                  . 
 
24. 贵公司对些合资公司的运作/绩效是否满意？ 
非常不满意                                非常满意    
财政收入                                                                1              2      3      4                 5 
整体运作满意程序                                                1              2      3      4                 5 
自己公司合资目标的达成: 
目标 1: (第2题答案)                                              1              2      3     4                 5  
目标 2: (第2题答案)                                              1              2      3     4                 5  
目标 3: (第2题答案)                                              1              2      3     4                 5  
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25.  如果贵公司对此合资公司的运作/绩效不满意，具体是哪一部分不满意？ 请说
明原因为什么不满意?  
                                                                                                                                               . 
. 
26. 是否有一些地方人认为合作伙伴可以改变一下从而提高此合资公司的运作效率？  
                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                             . 
 
 
姓名: ___________             ___                    职位: ___________       _______        ____ 
电话: __                             ____              邮件地址:  _                                            . 
您是否有参与了合资公司的建立? ____有        ____没有 
您现在与此合资公司的关系是: 
_______________________________________________________ 
您是否希望收到这个调研的结果? ____需要       ____不需要 
谢谢您的积极配合! 
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APPENDIX 2:  International Joint Venture (IJV) Performance Measures Studied in the 
Literature. Source (Ren et al. 2009:807) 
 
 
 
 
